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INTRODUCTION 
11God is deadl" These words of Friederik Nietzsche 
burst in upon the nineteenth century world of belief and 
speculation. God is dead and man has killed him. A note 
of despair was sounded for the believing Christian. Were 
there any grounds on which these traditional beliefs, in-
cluding the one concerning the existence of God, could be 
made meaningful? 
Before we can answer this question, we must be aware 
of just what Nietzsche was saying. According to Vincent 
Vycinas in his book, Earth~ Gods: An Introduction to the 
Philosophy of Martin Heidegger, what Nietzsche was saying 
was that God had ceased to be a philosophical problem.l 
One can no longer make positive assertions about something 
beyond the experienceable losos. 
Thought cannot reach the beyond-the-world-realm. Thought 
is the under-standing of worldly realities; it is not 
faith, the under-standing of beyond-the-world powers.2 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
That which is beyond experience cannot become a theme 
of human saying. Since God is beyond experience, any 
affirmation or negation of His existence or any consider-
ation of his essence is un-human in the sense that is is 
beyond the reach of human experience.3 
lvincent Vycinas, Earth~~ (The Hague: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1961), P• 317. 
2~., p. 314. 
3Ibid., P• 316. 
2 
A similar question, which took a different form, arose 
in the Anglo-Saxon countries with the beginning of the move-
ment known as logical positivism. The linguistic analysis 
movement, a related endeavor, began to raise questions con-
cerning the meaning of religious statements. A. J. Ayer, 
for example, felt that beliefs such as those found in the 
areas of theology, metaphysics, and ethics were basically 
emotive and lacked the kind of roots in empirical fact which 
would make possible their verification or disproof. From this 
time on, one of the major issues in contemporary philosophy 
of religion is the question concerning the meaning of religious 
statements. What is one asserting when he makes a statement 
about God? Are there no grounds on which religious statements 
can be verified? Just what is the legitimate subject matter 
of religious discourse, if there be any legitimate subject? 
Though the issue has been widely discussed, theieis an 
area of investigation, still largely unexplored, which seems 
to this writer to be a fruitful one in regard to what is 
involved in the question of the meaning of religious state-
ments. This approach is the phenomenological method first 
proposed by Husserl and later adopted and modified by such 
persons as Martin Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre and M. Merleau~ 
Ponty. There is, however, one major twentieth century thinker 
who is using the phenomenological method in the area of theology 
though this fact is not readily apparent to one who reads the 
commentaries on this man 1 s work. The person we are referring 
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to is the theologian Paul Tillioh, and it will be our concern 
to show the ways in which be employs the phenomenological 
method to investigate the subject matter of religion. 
In order to support our claim that Tillich 1 s theology 
can be understood from the standpoint of phenomenology, we 
shall approach the subject in the following manner. First, 
we shall deal with the essentials of the phenomenological 
method as they occur in the thinking of the two phenomenolo-
gists whose influence Tillich openly acknowledges. They are 
Edmund Husser! and Martin Heidegger. 
Edmund Husser!, sharing with the American, William James, 
the concern for analyzing experience from the standpoint of 
the consciousness of the self, sought to make philospphy a 
"rigorous science" by attempting to bracket all questions in-
volving the supposed existence of the natural world in order 
to study the essential structures of the phenomena directly 
present to consciousness. Tillich accepts this method as valid 
for investigating the so-called religious objects and beliefs. 
Rather than concerning ourselves with such questions as those 
of the existence of non-existence of God, we must focus on an 
analysis of the quality or dimension of reality which we en~ 
counter in religious experience. 
Martin Heidegger, who also influences Tillieh, departed 
from Husser! at much the same points as Tillich will. The 
world, says Heidegger, is given; it cannot be bracketed away. 
Phenomenology, rather than being the detached study of pure 
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essence must concentrate on the structures of man-in-the-world 
(Dasein). By analyzing these structures man can have access 
to Being, the goal and ground of all thinking and being. 
Tillich adopts much of Heidegger 1 s thinking at this 
point. Man, for Tillich, has an immediate experience of an 
unconditional element in religious experience. This experience 
supplies the answer to the question raised by finite existence, 
namely, how can a contingent being assert itself in the midst 
of all the forces which threaten it? To answer this question 
and to draw out the implications of religious experience far 
man's life, Tillich ~~alyzes man in much the same way that 
Heidegger does, as should be evident later. 
Following the chapter in which we deal with the basic 
patterns of the phenomenological method, we turn to a discussion 
of Tillich1 s thought, relating this wherever possible to what 
is said in the first chapter. The basis of our discussion is 
largely what Tillich says in Volume I of his Systematic Theology 
where he outlines his methodology and the problems with which 
he will deal. Supplementary material from his other writings 
is added where relevant to the discussion. 
This discussion prepares us for the concluding portion 
of the thesis in which the attempt is made to interpret major 
aspects of Tillich1 s thought from a phenomenological point of 
view. This can be done more carefully and more completely 
at this point than was possible in the more general survey of 
Chapter 2. The last section will hopefully make a contribution 
to the discussion we mentioned at the beginning, concerning 
the meaning and use of religious statements. 
Little or no attempt is made to evaluate the subject 
matter from other than an internal point of view. It is our 
concern in this paper to indicate in what sense Tillich is 
a phenomenologist and how this interpretation illumines many 
proble,matio aspects of his thought. 
CHAPTER I 
THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL METHOD 
Before we begin our discussion of the phenomenological 
method, it would be helpful to make explicit at the outset, 
the problem with which we propose to deal . Simple stated, 
the problem is: on what grounds or by what means do we have 
knowledge of or experience of God? In other words, what 
does the word "God" mean? 
Tillich, writing in the Augustinian tradition, argues 
that unless we are in some sense aware of God we could never 
inquire about Him. God must be present to us or we could 
never have knowledge of Him. For Augustine, this meant that 
by an analysis of our inner experience, especially the 
experience of certain normative elements which could not 
have coma through sense experience, we could make explicit 
an awareness of God. 
Tillich, who uses this basic approach, supports it 
further by the use of the phenomenological method. The 
reason for this is quite clear. If one holds that whatever 
knowledge we have of God must come by means of our own self• 
awareness, then a method which will enable us to analyze our 
experience as it is (as it is given to us) without being 
misled by certain "natural" prejudices (interpreting the 
-
nature of the self by analogy with natural objects)will give 
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us a sound basis for our knowledge of God. In order to know 
what 11God 11 means, we must analyze the structures of our 
experience and thus make explicit the presence of God which 
preceded even our thinking about Him. The phenomenological 
method is the best tool we have at present for dealing with 
such questions. Therefore, before we begin our discussion 
of Tillich, we shall endeavor in this chapter to set forth 
the basic principles and methods of the phenomenological 
movement, especially as found in the writings of two of its 
chief exponents: Edmund Husaerl and Martin Heidegger. This 
discussion will be basic to all of what follows. Even our 
short treatment of Tillich without explicit reference to his 
use of the phenomenological method unavoidably makes reference 
to points which can be understood only in relation to the 
method in question. 
The Quest for an Adequate Philosophical Method 
In the history of philosophical methodologies, various 
alternatives have been proposed as to tbe nature of philosophic 
data and how these data are to be investigated. One problem 
in this regard arises with the question of the extent to which 
one's methodology prejudices or distorts the data or the result 
of one's investigations. Edmund Husserl, for example, in 
developing his concept of phenomenology conceived the idea 
of a method of investigating data without any presuppositional 
prejudices that would prevent one from seeing what the true 
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nature of the object of one 1 s investigation was. This method 
would investigate the data of pure consciousness, analyze the 
essential structures found in such data and th reby make 
possible philosophy as a r~gorous science. 
If philosophy is to make a legitimate contribution to 
man's knowledge, claimed Husserl and the phenomenologists, 
it must pay careful attention to that which is given directly 
and immediately to consciousness. This is not an easy task 
and it is a long way from an uncritical intuition. A very 
precise and rigorous methodology is required in order to bring 
a person to the point where he can "see" what is really given. 
By some method of reduction he must suspend all prejudices 
in the way he looks at things. Only in this way are the data 
open to investigation. At the stage, in which the data are 
immediately present to consciousness, a limit has been reached 
in discursive reasoning and one must accept what is given !! 
!1 1! given. At this point the phenomenological method is 
descriptive rather than discursive. As Herbert Spiegelberg 
defines it in his book, The Phenomenological Movement: 
••• the main function of a phenomenological descr~ption 
is to serve as a reliable guide to the listener's 
(or observer's) own actual or potential experience 
of the phenomena. It is in this sense never more 
than ostensive, or better, directive. Its essential 
fUnction is to provide unmistakable guideposts to 
the phenomena themselves.! 
Such a procedure will create what Spiegelberg calls 
"reverence for phenomena."2 Each kind of data present to 
!Herbert Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement 
(The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff;-!960), II. P• 673. 
21J2.!!!• p. 700. 
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the mind will be studied £or its own sake and according to 
the particular structures in which it is manifest. At this 
stage it is illegitimate to accept any £a! kind of data or 
experience (such as that of sensory experience) as basic, 
to the exclusion of others. 
Furthermore, the phenomenological method focuses on 
consciousness and its experience as opposed to a pre-occupation 
with the objects of consciousness. This will provide knowledge 
of the structures which make experience as we know it possible. 
This emphasis is closely related to our first point, the aware-
ness of the data of immediate experience. If one's primary 
concern is immediate experience, he must study it at the level 
of "pure" consciousness. Our only access to phenomena, accord-
ing to the phenomenologists, is through the stnuctures of our 
own consciousness. We must "bracket", for a time, any refer-
enoe to objects other than consciousness as the cause of what 
is given and we must momentarily suspend any interest in the 
objects themselves apart from their relation to consciousness. 
The problem with ordinary scientific accounts, £or example, 
is that they focus on the objects and neglect the consciousness 
which is aware of them. We must attempt to discover the world 
of experience prior to reflection, that is, prior to the 
positing of objects as independent entities, thereby neglecting 
their relation to consciousness.l 
1M. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenologt of Perce~tion trans. 
Colin Smith (New York: The Humanities Press, 19 2), p. x. 
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The forerunner of this type of approach was the 
American psychologist William James. It was James who intro-
duced the term nstream of thought" ( 11 stream of consciousness" 
for Husserl) to refer to man's psychic experiences. It was 
his concern to focus on the nature of consciousness itself 
and to determine how things appeared from this point of view, 
to examine what was given to the mind and to see what the 
mind's role was in regard to what was presented. Two aspects 
of James's thinking are especially relevant to a discussion 
of phenomenology. These are: thought as owned and thought as 
intentional. 
James made the point that every thought is a part of 
personal consciousness. We can never step outside of our 
own awareness. Each thought is owned by a personal self. 
What this means is that we must recognize the limitations 
within which thought must work. Thoughts are not objective, 
detached units; they belong to a self. They are owned and 
thus reflect the experience of the particular thinker. This 
gives to each person hi~ own particular life-world (Husserl•s 
term) or perspective.l 
The second aspect of James's thought that is important 
to our purposes is his noticing ·that thought always appears 
to deal with objects other than itself (consciousness is 
'intentional'). Thought singles out parts of the stream of 
thought for its attention. This means that the mind has an 
lWilliam James, The Princilles of Psychology (New York: 
Dover Publications, Ini:; 1956) , p.~25. 
11 
active role in selecting certain aspects of the stream of 
thought and can willingly change the fouus, thus bringing 
some parts into sharper relief and relegating others to the 
fringe areas. It is this fact which orders the "primordial 
chaos" of what is given, into some sort of intelligible order. 
The loss of the ability to focus on certain aspects of the 
stream, to order the parts in some sort of meaningful whole, 
has severe psychological consequences. For example, James 
describes the situation in which attention plays a minor, 
almost non~existent role, as follows: 
The eyes are fixed on vacancy, the sounds of the world 
melt into confused unity, the attention is dispersed 
so that the whole body is felt, as it were, at onee, 
and the foraground of consciousness is filled, if by 
anything, by a sort of solimn sense of surrender to 
the empty passing of time. 
Thus, the factor of attention and our ability to detect 
similarities among some of the items in the stream of thought 
is necessary not only for thought but for psychic health. 
This ability to detect similar! ties ("essences" in Husserl' s 
terms) is what makes conception possible . This James defines 
as "!h!. function !?z which !!!. ~ identifz .! numericallz 
distinct and permanent subject 2!, discourse. 11 2 To conceptu• 
alize is to single out by attention a part of what is present 
to us and to hold to this in the midst of the fluctuating 
appearances. Thought transforms what we perceive into a 
conceptual order. Two quotes from James make this point clear. 
lill,!!.' p. 404. 
2Ib1d., P• 461. 
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Every one or our conceptions is or something which our 
attention originally tore out of the continuum of relt 
experience, and provisionally isolated so as to make 
or it an individual topic or discourse. Every one or 
them has a way, if the mind is left alone with it, of 
suggesting other parts of the continuum rrom which it 
was torn, for conception to work upon it in a similar 
way.l 
The conceptual scheme is a sort of sieve in which we 
try to gather up the world's contents. Most facts 
and relations fall through its meshes, being either 
too subtle or insignificant to be rixed in any con-
ception. But whenever a physical reality is caught 
and identiried as the same with something already 
conceived, it remains on the sieve, and all the predi-
cates and relations of the conception with which it is 
identiried become its predicates and relations too; it 
is subjected to the sieve's network, in other words.2 
However, when we look carefully at the intentional 
nature of our thoughts, we notice that not only does attention 
single out objects from the rlux presented to it but there are 
also psychic overtones or fringes that surround the more or 
less distinct objects of consciousness. We can detect tenden-
cies or brain processes which make us aware of relations and 
ob~~cta that are but dimly perceived.3 The derinite images 
or consciousness are only a small part of our minds. As James 
picturesquely put it: '~very definite image in the mind is 
steeped and dyed in the free water that flows around it."4 
The significance of this is that it gives substance to the 
claim that we need to focus on consciousness and its structures 
before preceding to deal with the nature of the objects pre-
sen ted to us. 
1 Ibid., P• 465. 
2rbid., 
-
p. 482. 
3~., p. 258. 
4!.£!!!.' p. 255. 
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Despite the fringes, however, it is the fact of attention 
that helps account for the fact of sameness perceptible in 
varied objects. Because attention focuses on certain more or 
less stable elements in the particular things presented to us, 
this enables us to detect similar things in varied contexts. 
Thus, we find that many human thoughts have the same objects. 
We can think of the color red in a variety of contexts, for 
example, and still be able to identify it as the same color. 
This sameness in a multiplicity of objects is the basis of 
our belief in realities existing outside of our thought.l 
This recognition of identities, of being able to differentiate 
similar objects or relations in the fluctuating stream of 
thought is what makes thinking itself possible. Again, to 
quote James: 
Reasoning depends on the ability of the mind to break 
up the totality of t~ phenomenon reasoned about, into 
parts, and to pick out, from among these the particular 
one which, in our ~ivan emergency, may lead to the 
proper conclusion. 
Or,to put it another way: 
The mind ••• works on the data it receives very much as 
a sculptor works on his block of stone •••• Just so, the 
world of each of us, howsoever our several views of it 
may be, all lay embedded in the primordial chaos of 
sensations, which gave the mere matter to the thought 
of all of us indifferently.3 
From thia "primordial chaos of sensationsu each person 
splits the world into two parts 'me' and 'not me• and each of 
1!2..!S!·, P• 272. 
2Ib1d., P• 465. 
3~ •• P• 482 
us dichotomizes the world in a different place. This insignts 
will be helpful to understanding the idea or the self-world 
polarity in Heidegger and Tillich as well as the concept of 
Lebenswelt (Life World) in Husserl. 
To summarize some of the things we have said and to 
justify an inclusion of James in a discussion of phenomenology, 
we can see that certain aspects of James's thought ~e similar 
to some of the emphases of the phenomenologists. For example, 
we can understand more clearly what Husserl means by a study 
of consciousness if we understand James's investigation of the 
stream of thought. What is involved here is a switch from the 
common sense with objects to a concentration of the other side 
of the relation, that of consciousness. It is in consciousness, 
rather than the "external" world for both James and Husserl, 
that we have our most accurate and certain knowledge of "reality". 
Also, James's ideas concerning conception are similar at many 
points to Husserl 1 s discussion of essences. In both cases we 
have the recognition of certain stable elements which make 
knowledge possible. Thus, James's significance for the pheno-
menological movement is his idea of the stream of thought and 
the fact that we must begin with our own lived experience and 
must search for the primordial truth of the world ~ ~ experi-
~ll·l 
The main reason for including a discussion of James at 
this point was to make clear what it means to shift attention 
lJ~hn Wild, Existence and the World of Freedom (Englewood 
Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall;-lnc:; 1963),-p. 30. 
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from objects to the consciousness for which they are objects. 
This is not easily done. Our usual ways of thinking are 
centrifugal, to use a phrase of John Wild's, and we have the 
tendency to "lose ourselves in the objects to which ••• inten-
tions are directed.nl On the common sense view, we have the 
belief that we are experiencing the external world. The 
emphasis is on the object of consciousness. The phenomeno-
logical view, on the other hand, wishes to emphasize that 
"there is experience having those characteristics that lead 
us to believe that there is a world. n2 
Phenomenological Techniques 
In order to know that the self is intentional as well 
as to know just what is the nature of our experience, we must 
use reduction or bracketing. In Husserl 1 s thought, reduction 
will be a transcendent one, attempting to return to 'pure' 
consciousness as the starting point of philosophy. This 
would give us the universal ground of the intentional experi-
ence. This concern for essences rather than existents puts 
philosophy in a category with geometry, the science of pure 
essences. Such was the aim of Husserl 1 s work.3 
A method that is concerned about essences (th nature 
of which will be described in more detail in our discussion 
libid., P• 32. 
2Fernando Molina, Existentialism ~ Philosophy (Engle• 
Wood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962), p. 40. 
3Marvin Farber, "Phenomenology" in Twentieth Centurz 
Philosophy, ed. D. Runes, (N.Y.: Phil. Library, 1943), P• 353. 
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o~ Husserl) is necessarily selective# and will focus on what 
a thing is, that is, what defines its particular nature. 
In fact, such an approach will focus exclusively on the ~ 
of a thing rather than the !E!! (the question of a thing's 
existence or non-existence).l This involves a very precise 
kind of methodological reduction in which the essences can 
be discerned through the ways things are presented to con-
sciousness from the different perspectives. This kind of 
reduction is described by Herbert Spiegelberg as follows: 
(The phenomenological reduction aims to) detach the 
phenomena of our every day experience from the context 
of our naive or natural living~ while preserving their 
content as purely as possible.~ 
This invol v·es what the phenomenologists call 11bracke ting", 
or a suspending of judgment in regard to a thing's existence 
or non-existence and focusing on the essential nature of the 
thing as it gives itself to our consciousness. This does not 
mean, however, that a thing's existence is denied. It only 
means that such a question is temporarily suspended. To 
bracket is not to eliminate.3 All elements of one's natural 
experience are preserved and are merely looked at in a dif-
ferent way. This means that a thing is not posited as an 
existent when we are engaged in the bracketing process, but 
a thing is regarded as ttmerely the objectivity correlative 
to my awareness of it. It is the noema that corresponds 
to the cognitive activity# or the noesis."4 
lspiegelberg, 2E• £!1., P• 673. 
2.!J2.!i!., P• 691. 
3spiegelberg, ''Phenomenology and Existentialism", p. 66. 
4Farber, ££• cit., p. 356. 
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What remains after the bracketing has taken place and 
the natural way of looking at things in terms of their exist-
ence or non-existence has been suspended, is the pure 
'phenomena', the object of the phenomenologists' investiga-
tion. The basic question then becomes 11What is our experience 
of something?" not "Does something exist?" Our concern should 
be to describe what is given, in the way it is given.l 
Edmund Husser!: Neutral Phenomenology 
With this preliminary discussion of the principles and 
techniques of the phenomenological movement before us, we 
are ready to turn to a consideration of the phenomenological 
method as found in the writings of Edmund Husser! and Martin 
Heidegger. We begin with Husser!. Husser!, in his attempt 
to make philosophy a rigorous science, attempted to arrive 
at the knowledge of those phenomena immediately present to 
consciousness and to study their essential structures. He 
wanted to d1 vorce these phenomena "from every kind of exist-
ential and systematic connection for the purpose of ascertain-
ing what makes a thing exactly what it is and not something 
else. 112 This he would do by means of the bracketing process 
whose primary concern was with the meaning or essence of a 
thing, not its existence.3 We could then study the data of 
immediate consciousness without raising the question of 
whether or not a thing exists. We would suspend such a 
lspiegelberg, ~ Phenomenological Movement II, p. 662. 
2E. Parl Welch, Edmund Husserl 1 s Phenomenology (Los 
Anse~es: The University of Southern California Press, 1938) P• 9. 
3Ibid., P• 10 
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belief in order to secure phenomena in their pure and indubi• 
table form, free from transcendent interpretations (their 
objective reference). Such a reduction is •transcendental' 
in that "it suspends (ausschalten) all transcendent claims 
(i.e., assertions about reality other than that of conscious-
ness itself)."l We can accept things simply as they give 
themselves, as representatives of only themselves and knowable 
through intuition. 
The difficulty involved is due to the prejudice of our 
natural way of looking at things which must be suspended if 
we are to be aware of phenomena in their pure form. The 
natural standpoint can be described quite simply as the belief 
in the externality of objects rather than a concentration on 
the way those objects are in fact present to c.onsciousness. 
E. Parl Welch, in writing his book, Edmund Husserl's Pheno-
menology, put it this way: 
The first outlook' upon life that we have is from the 
standpoint of 'natural' human beings: creatures that 
will judge, feel, imagine 'from the natural standpoint.• 
Considered from such a starting point, what does the 
world actually consist of? I · am aware of a world that 
is 'spread out in space endlessly and in time becoming 
and become without end. I am aware of it, and that 
means above all I discover it immediately, intuitively; 
I experience it.' (Ideen, 48) Corporal things are simply 
spatially distributed before me, and they are apprehended 
through the variety of sensory perception, such as seeing, 
touching, and feeling; with this sensory perception is 
an 'intuitive• content: spatial things, temporal ev~nts, 
and - their relations are just simply 'there• for me. 
lspiegelberg, ££•£!!•, pp. 119-120 & 126. 
2welch, ££•£!!•, PP• 14-15. 
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Husser! finds such a standpoint inadequate for a 
number of reasons. But, before we can go into this, we 
must be aware of the grounds on which he thinks another 
attitude than that of the natural standpoint can be taken. 
The reason why we suspect that the natural standpoint does 
not take account of the actual state of affairs is that we 
are aware of feelings and valuations which we attach to the 
objects we assume are 'given.• Husser! puts it this way: 
This world (the world we assume to be natural) is 
not there for me as a mere world of facts and affairs, 
but, with the same immediacy, as a-world of values, 
a world Q! goods, a practical world. Without further 
effort on my part I find the things before me furnished 
not only with the qualities that befit their positive 
nature, but with value-characters such as beautiful or 
ugly, agreeable or disagreeable, pleasant or unpleasant, 
and so forth.l 
What this dmplies is that my attending to an object adds 
something to the object, as it were (the object is pleasant, 
valuable, etc.) and gives us hints that the perceptual act 
is to some extent controlled or modified by our perspective. 
There are shades of meaning around my perceptual object which 
would differ from those around the "same" perceptual object 
of another person. 
Thus, the natural standpoint which regards our experience 
as emerging from a connection with the world must be carefully 
analyzed. The result of such analysis, for Husserl, is the 
insight that the world has meaning only in relation to a 
knowing subject . Therefore, such a position as that of the 
lEdmund Husser!, Ideas, trans. W. R. Boyce Gibson 
(New York: Collier Books, 1962), P• 93. 
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natural standpoint must be suspended if we are to accurately 
understand the nature of experience. This suspension is 
necessary because ~he natural standpoint involves us in 
prejudices which must be overcome before we can look at the 
phenomena in their 'pure' form. These prejudices are: (1) 
objects have factual existence, (2) the preconception that 
the object of consciousness belongs to the natural world and 
(3) the preconception that cognition results from a psycho-
physical, stimulus-response relationship. All of these 
prejudices must be overcome. e must clear away all refer-
ences which are relative to empirical conditions. We must 
learn to see objects as they display themselves in their 
essentially rational structure which is the object's nucleus . l 
This requires a kind of bracketing described by Husserl 
as follows: 
~ put out of action the general thesis which 
belongs !2 ~ essence 2£ ~ natural standpoint, 
we place in brackets whatever it includes respecting 
the nature of Being: ~ entire natural world there-
~ which is continually 'there for us,• 'present 
to our hand,• and will ever remain there, is a 
'fact-world' -of which we continute to be conscious, 
even though- it pleases us to put it in brackets. 
If I do this, as I am fully free to do, I do 
not then deny this 11;orld, 1 ••• I do not doubt that 
it!! there ••• but I use the 'phenomenological~~ox,n, 
which completelz bars !! ~ using any iudgment ~ concerns spatio-temporal existenceDasein).2 
This reduction enables us to see what is indubitably 
given. We move first from particular facts to general 
in lAnna-Teresa Tymieniecka, Phenomenologz and Science 
ContemEorary European Thought (N.Y.: Noonday Press, 1962) ....... P• 10. 
2Husserl, £E•£!!•, PP• 99-100. 
21 
essenoes (eidetic reduction) and then we attempt to free 
phenomena from trans-phenomenal elements~ i.e. belief in 
the trans-phenomenal existence of a thing. After all this 
is accomplished~ •we are left with what is indubitably 
given.' Thus~ the purpose of the reduction was: 
to inhibit and •take back'~ as it were~ all references 
to the •transcendent' as the intentional correlate 
of our acts and to trace them back to the immanent or 
• transcendent' acta in which they have their source."l 
We are then in the position to study what is really 
given in experience and this given is consciousness and its 
structures. To quote Husserl: 
Thus we fix our eyes steadily upon the sphere of 
consciousness and study what it is that we find 
immanent in it •••• What we lack above all is a certain 
general insight into the essence of consciousness 
1e general~ and quite specially also of consciousness, 
so far as in and through its essential Being, the 
•natural' fact-world comes to be known.2 
This residuum of the radical reduction is what Husserl 
calls 'pure consciousness' and is accessible to us by means 
of the phenomenological epokhe. He says of this pure con-
sciousness: 
••• Consciousness in itself has a being of its own which 
in its absolute uniqueness of nature remains unaffected 
by the phenowenological disconnection. (entire passage 
italicized) • .:S 
This absolute being of consciousness~ he goes on to say, is 
a stream of experiences having essences as its content. These 
1Spiegelberg, £E• ~., I, p. 136. 
2Husserl, £2• ~., P• 102. 
3ill5!· 
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essences, which are open to intuition and can be known, 
give meaning to the world by being the stable structures 
by which we can recognize what a thing is. It is the 
essences which constitute the world as such and such and 
these essences are known through intuition after reduction 
has taken place. It is through the Ego which is in constant 
relation to the realm or essences that we can grasp the 
meaning or objects and events. Thus, the Ego is the pre~ 
supposition or knowing the world (to be known is to be 
experienced in relation to an Ego and its consciousness), 
though Husserl would not be willing to say that the Ego 
constitutes the world. 1 Something closer to what James means 
by the selr•s selecting aspects or the stream of thought for 
its attention is probably what is meant here. 
Before moving on to a discussion of intentionality in 
Husserl's thought, a few remarks should be made about the 
nature or the essences we have been discussing. First of 
all, when we analyze the way things are present to conscious-
ness, we notice that though the intended objects are trans-
cendent when we view the natural world {that is, the objects 
are not themselves in consciousness only our idea of them, 
as it were), and are thus not absolute (a thing appears 
differently to us depending on which perspective we take); 
nevertheless, there is a core which remains identical and 
enables us to recognize things in different contexts. How 
lwelch, 2£• cit., PP• 14 & 26. 
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is it possible, for example, that I can recognize the simi-
larity of the pen with which I am writing to other pens? 
There must be some essence that my consciou ness is aware 
of and which enables it to give a certain, fixed meaning to 
what is presented to it. 
The question of essences is the question of the 
"perceived as such" or the essential quality of that which 
is presented to consciousness. Husser! illustrates this by 
using the example of our awareness of a tree as a natural 
object and the tree as a certain essential structure: 
The !£!! Elain ~ simple 1 the t~g in nature, is 
as different as it can be from this Eerceived ~ 
~ ~~ which as perceptual meaning belongs to the 
perception, and that inseparably. The tree plain 
and simple can burn away, resolve it.self into its 
chemical elements, and so forth. But the meaning--
the meaning of ia!! perception, something that 
belongs necessarily to its essence--cannot burn away; 
it has no chemical elements, no forces, no real 
properties. 
Whatever in purely immanent and reduced form is 
peculiar to the experience, and cannot be thought 
aw<s:y· .from it, as it is in itself, and in its eidetic 
setting passes !2 iESO into the Eidos, is separated 
from all Nature and physics, and1not less from all psychology by veritable abysses. 
The task of the phenomenological reduction, in this 
context, is to fix this essential {noematic) meaning in 
distinction from the object as viewed from the natural stand-
point. The noematic {essential) meaning of an object, then, 
is a central nucleus, essentially the self-same in different 
aspects. 2 However, different objects have different essential 
lHusserl, ~· £!£., P• 240. 
2Ibid., P• 245. 
structures. For example, 
At one time that which appears is characterized as 
•corporal reality,' at another as fiction, then 
again as recollection brought before the mind, and 
so forth. 
These are characters which we ~ as inseparable 
features £! the pereeived, fancied, remembered, etc., 
as such; £!: !!:!! meaning !a! perception, !!!! meaning .2! 
fancy, ~ meaning .2! memor1, .!!!£ .!! necessarily be-
longing to these !a correlation with the respective 
types Q! noetic experiences.! 
This has far-reaching implications for a view such as 
that of Tillich. Tillioh is concerned to show that religious 
experience interpreted according to the criterion of the 
final revelation of the New Being or the Christ, is a .pheno-
mena which has its own structures or essences open to pheno-
menological observation. Tillich•s concern is to Qefine 
this kind of religious experience ~ ~ in order that its 
particular meaning and significance can be determined. Mare 
about this will be said in the last chapter. 
To return to our consideration of essences and the 
significance they have in conscious experience, Husserl 
speaks of perception as a constant flux in which objects 
appear constant, even when seen from different perspectives, 
because the meaning of it is there for the Ego through the 
presence of the essences . As Husser! puts it: 
An empirical consciousness of a self-same thing 
that looks 1 all-round 1 its object, and in so doing 
is continually confirming the unity of its own nature, 
essentially and necessarily possesses a manifold system 
of continuous patterns of appearance and perspective 
variations, in and through which all objective phases 
lrbid., 
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of the bodily selr-glven which appear in perception 
manifest themselves perspectively in definite continua.l 
In other words, the "meaning is caught". In order for this 
to be possible, the experience of the Ego must have an 
intentional character. It must always be conscious of some-
thing, its object must be the transcendent essences, otherwise 
the Ego would not be able to discern meaning in the flux 
presented to it.2 It is this intentionality of eonsciousness 
which makes an event in the stream of thought different from 
other events in the stream. Perceptions are not just con-
figurations of data but they have meaning or sense because 
of the Ego's awareness of the essences which constitute them. 
Therefore, the meaning is in my awareness though the object 
itself is not. The world {the totality of objects) is trans~ 
cendent and not immediately given to consciousness.3 What 
this means is that the so-called external object does not 
belong to the concrete real nature of perception itself.4 
Thus, intention, by means of the essences, identifies 
{its objectifying function) and allows us to assign a variety 
of successive data to the same referents or 'poles' of meaning.5 
In addition to this identifying function, intention also 
connects and thereby makes possible a unified experience. 
To quote Herbert Spiegelberg: 
1~., P• 118. 
2welch, ££• ~., PP• 38-39. 
3Molina, £2• £!!., PP • 48-49. 
~Husserl , £2• ~·• P• 117. 
5spiegelberg, 2E• £!!., p. 108. 
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Each aspect or an identical object refers to related 
aspects which form its horizon, as it were •••• It gives 
rise to legitimat expectations ror further experiences, 
which may or may not be fulfilled in the further de-
velopment of our experiences , yet are clearly fore-
shadowed in what is given. l 
This idea of the connectedness of experience and the 
ability of parts of objects to refer to the parts which 
constitute its horizon brings us to the final aspects of 
Husserl's thought to be considered here. This is the concept 
of the Lebenswelt or life-world, a concept that will furnish 
as a transition to the thought of Heidegger. For Husserl, 
there were a number of possible life-worlds, each of which 
had its own pervading structure and style. In many ways this 
seems to be an extension of the idea of the varied standpoints. 
What was originally only the natural-eidetic distinction seems 
to have been broadened into the idea of multiple perspectives 
or life-worlds, each of which has its own peculiar style just 
as the different kinds of phenomena have their own modes of 
appearances . This is as close as Husserl gets to a meta-
physics . Husserl goes on to say that these different life -
worlds are not immediately accessible to the average person 
in the •natural' attitude. Each life-world has a particular 
perspective from which it must be viewed, and each has an 
horizon or fringes (an area not distinctly present to con-
sciousness) . However , this is in no way to be interpreted 
as an objective cosmology. We are still regarding things 
from the point of view of the personal consciousness . The 
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world is always the world as experienced by a living subject 
in his particular perspective.! It is therefore necessarily 
subjective and relative. A life-world "is to be conceived 
as an oriented world with an experiencing self at its center, 
designated as such by personal pronouns."2 
MARTIN EEIDEGGER: Existential Phenomenology 
With this concept of Life-world in Husserl's thought, 
we are ready to proceed to a discussion of Martin Heidegger 
who makes his major point of concern the self-world relation 
rather than the relation of essences to a 'pure consciousness•. 
However, the world, for Heidegger is not objective any more 
than it was for Husserl. Though it is given to consciousness 
(is not a construct of consciousness) it is always a world 
!2£ ~ self and it is in this sense that it must be understood. 
First of all, by way of getting into this part of the 
chapter, it would be helpful to note the points at which 
Heidegger will depart from Husserl. As we have noted, 
Husser!' s primary interest was the world of experience 
rather than the experienced world. The latter was put in 
brackets so that the essential nature of what was present 
to - conseiousness could be studied more clearly. His major 
concern was the study of the structure of consciousness and 
by a rigid scientific kind of method, study the ess ntial 
structures of experience. Heidegger, by contrast, shifts 
!Spiegelberg, ~· ~., P• 161. 
2Ibid., P• 162. 
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emphasis to the self ~ the world and attempts to discover 
the structure of Being (his primary concern) by an analysis 
of the self.l 
It was Heidegger 1 s contention, contrary to Husserl, 
that we could not haye an accurate picture of the actual 
state of affairs without some kind of metaphysics. Reality 
could not be bracketed because it is only in relation to 
the basic reality or objective Being that the self finds 
its own nature~ There must, therefore, be found some point 
of correspondence between reality and our knowledge of it. 
It was only the latter that occupied Husserl 1 s concern. 
For Heidegger, such detachment, even though a methodological 
contrivance, actually was a distortion.2 
Heidegger agreed with Husserl that there is no real 
world independent of the individual but he did not feel 
that the world of things was devoid of meaning apart from 
human projects. Poets and artists continually point out 
the intrinsic significance of that which is, other than 
ourselves. However, the whole thrust of Heidegger's thought 
proceeds in a different direction from that of Husserl. For 
Heidegger, the direction of intentionality is toward Being, 
not toward essences in 'pure consciousness. 1 3 He thus 
substituted human existence for the pure ego of Husserl. 
lH. J. Blackham, Six Existentialist Thinkers (London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul Lid., 1952), PP• 87-88. 
2Helmut Kukn, Encounter with Nothingness (Hinsdale, 
Ill.: Henry Regnery Co., 1948), P.• 135. 
3James Collins, The Existentialists (Chicago: Henry 
Regnery Co., 1963), pp~oo-2o1. 
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The rundamental wonder, ror Heidegger, was objective Being 
not subjective consciousness.l 
This led Heidegger to conceive of phenomenology in a 
way different from Husserl. In Heidegger's hands, pheno-
menology became the tool of an existential hermeneutic which 
aimed at the investigation or the nature of Being through 
the structures round in the human self. Phenomenology still 
meant, as it did for Husserl, a methodological conception 
which does not designate ~ a thing is but only ~ it is 
to be approached. In defining the term 'phenomenology', 
Heidegger rerers to its Greek etymology and its meaning 
•to show itself'• He goes on to say that "an entity can 
show itself from itself (!£a !hm selbst ~) in many ways, 
depending in each case on the kind of access we have to it. 112 
This 'showing itself' is like the sy.mptoms of a disease. 
The reason why a phenomenological investigation can . 
be fruitful is that the things which show themselves have 
a logos structure. The criterion by which the truth or 
ralsity of a phenomenological investigation can be judged 
is whether it accurately represents this structure. The 
logos nature of the object and the phenomenological method 
must be correlated so as "to let that which shows itself 
be seen from itself in the very way it shows itself from 
itself.") 
1spiegelberg, 2£• £!!., PP• 282-284. 
2Martin Heidegger, Beinf ~ ~~ trans, John 
Macquarrie & Edward Robinson London: SCM Press, Ltd., 1962) 
P• 51. 
3~ •• p. 58. 
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This logos structure which the phenomenological method 
investigates in an attempt to discover the nature of Being 
is manifest only through particular things or beings. As 
one commentator put it: 
Just as light cannot be pereeived without the things 
it illuminates, Being also could not possibly be 
brought into appearance without the things which 
appear on its horizon. On the other hand, beings 
can only appear in the light of Being.l 
In a rather lengthy passage in Being ~ ~' which 
we shall quote here in its entirety, Heidegger describes in 
more detail just what it is that the phenomenological method 
has as its object of investigation. 
What is it that phenomenology is to 1 let us see'? 
What is it that must be called a 'phenomenon' in a 
distinctive sense? What is it that by its very 
essence is necessarily the theme whenever we exhibit 
something explicitli? Manifestly, it is something 
that proximally and for the most part does not show 
itself at all: it is something that lies hidden, in 
contrast to that which proximally and for the moat 
part does show itself; but at the same time it is 
something that belongs to what thus shows itself, 
and it belongs to it so essentially as to constitute 
its meaning and its ground. 
Yet that which remains hidden in an egregious 
sense, or which relapses and gets covered ~ again, 
or which shows itself only '!a disguise•, is not 
just this entity or that, but rather the Beigg of 
entitiea •••• This Being can be covered up so exten-
sively that it becomes forgotten and no question arises 
about it or about its meaning. Thus that which demands 
that it become a phenomenon, and which demands this in 
a distinctive sense and in terms of its ownmost content 
as a thing, is what phenomenology has taken into its 
grasp thematically as its object. 
Phenomenology is our way of access to what is to 
be the theme of ontology, and it is our way of giving 
it demonstrative preo~sion. Only !! phenomenology 
is ontology possible. 
!vincent Vycinas, Earth and ~ (The Hague: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1961), P• 5. 
2He1degger, .2£• ill•, PP• 59-60. 
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The problem with traditional metaphysics. according to 
Heidegger is that it has distorted the nature or the self-
world relation by describing the self in terms drawn rrom 
the world. Philosophy, which should be a dialogue between 
Being and being, as it was in the thinking or the pre-
Socratics whose very language, Heidegger reels, 11revealed 
the revealing philosophical realities. 11 has become distorted 
through the use of terminology which seeks to represent and 
classify rather than reveal. This was first apparent in the 
Greek metaphysics or Plato and Aristotle. These thinkers, 
according to Beidegger, turned from Being to beings as the 
fundamental question of metaphysics thus dividing and 
estranging the latter from the former. This gap was quite 
evident in the Platonic separation of Ideas and opinion. 1 
The basic problem in such a system is that man is now 
correlated with the order of extended things, the model of 
Greek and Scholastic metaphysics. Becaus philosophy has 
lost the primary understanding of Being, it has lost the 
true understanding of man. The world has been split into 
subjects and objects with no reference to Being. As Vincent 
Vycinas puts it in his commentary on Heidegger's thought: 
By considering things or beings merely as objects, 
traditional philosophy violates them by forcing them 
into various systems and by not treating them the 
way they are in tbemselves.2 
lWilliam Klubeck & Jean T. Wilde, "Introduction" to 
Heidegger 1 s !E! Question of Being (New York: Twayne Publishers 
Inc., 1958), P• 11. 
2vycinas, 22• ~., P• 1. 
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Man cannot be defined simply as subject-in-opposition-to-
objec~. Such a procedure fails to grasp the uniqueness of 
human nature in opposttion to that which is, and fails to 
determine the horizon where the problem of being can be 
raised. 1 
This question regarding the nature and manifestation 
of Being is the major concern of Heidegger 1 s work. In this 
regard he differs from Husserl, not just as regards the 
major emphasis of his thought but in regarding Being as in 
some sense given. Bracketing of the "existential" question 
is neither necessary nor possible. In Being ~ ~ the 
emphasis is on the hiddenness of Being as the following 
quotation makes clear: 
The phenomenological concept of phenomenon (is) that 
of a phenomenon which 1first and foremost' (zumachst 
und zumeist) does not show itself but remains hidden 
as the meaning (Sinn) and ground (Grund) of what shows 
itsel.r.2 
The clue to the nature of what is hidden is found in the 
human self. How this is possible can be seen when it is 
understood what Heidegger means by the self-world polarity. 
For him, self and world are inseparably connected. The 
world has meaning only for (or in relation) to the self 
but the self would not be conscious of itself without the 
consciousness of the world rrom which it is removed. As 
Herbert Spiegelberg puts it: 
lcollins, ££• ~., pp. 180-181. 
2Heidegger, £2• £!!., p. 35. 
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For human being, as He idegger understands it does not, 
and even cannot, occur except in the framework of an 
encompassing world with which it belongs together, into 
which it finds itself inserted.! 
Man is a relation, not a self-sufficient being. This related-
ness is the essence of human existence. What man is related 
to is Being and all his acts are responses to it. In this 
way does man become man.2 The basic structure of man, then, 
is Being-in-the-world. 
This particular nature of man as Being-in-the-world 
gives man a privileged access to Being. Man stands, as it 
were, in the 'clearing of Being' or as James Collins (!h! 
Existentialists) put it: 
Man is the focus of the relationship of being to the 
totality of that-which-is, the temple where being can 
make a clearing shelter for itself.) 
In fact, Being has meaning in so far as it 'protrudes' into 
such a human being. Here we can see the importance of an 
existential hermeneutic such as Heidegger attempts. To 
understand Being we must understand a particular thing-in-
being. In this case, it is the human self and its moods 
(eg. fear and anxiety) which indicates more clearly than 
any other evidence available to us, the nature of being.4 
Thus, if Being and its relationship to man is made 
the primary object of the phenomenological investigation, 
lspiegelberg, 
.21!• ill· I P• 328 • 
2vycinas, 
.2£• ill·· P• 3. 
3collins, 
.Q.E• ill·· P• 20 • 
4spiegelberg, 
.2£• ill•• P• 285 • 
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we have a di~ferent kind o~ intentional object than was the 
case with Husser!. Consciousness is intentional; of that 
there is no dispute. However, if the giveness of Being is 
somehow assumed as basic to an understanding of the very 
selfhood of man, then this becomes the intentional object 
rather than general essences as in Husser!. By switching 
from essences to Being as the intentional object, Heidegger 
has developed two new concepts: those of projection (Entwurf) 
and transcendence. 1 Project, according to Helmut Kuhn in 
Encounter~ Nothingness is Husserl 1 s intentionality made 
dynamic, a focus on the center of existence not on the epoche. 
This means that Heidegger regards the world as projected by 
man and unified by purposive intent. Man projects himself 
as being-in-the-world in order that he might realize what 
it means to be a human self. 11Existence transcending itself 
traverses the world to return to itself. 11 2 This, as we noted 
earlier, means that the world is always a world for a self 
and it is from the world that the self obtains its objects 
of consciousness. 
To put it another way, our concern is the factor which 
dates the otherwise undifferentiated stream of instants. 
Concern is at the root of all our dealings. Things in the 
world are not simply •out there' but are tools for our 
purposes and interests. Man is Dasein, Being-in-the-world; 
this is the mode of existence of the human being. Objects 
lKuhn, £E.• ill•• P• 1.38. 
2 Ibid., P• 14.3. 
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of a person• s conce.rn are like tools existing in an elaborate 
system .of . regular, serviceable, but modifiable relations. 
H. J. Blackham summarizes it this way: 
the objects as tool is constituted by the system of 
relations in which it exists, and refers to and ends 
in ~asein, which is itself constituted by its relations 
to the system but refers to its own possibilities and 
not to the system for its meaning. Dasein as pos -
sibility (the source of possibilities) and constituted 
by relations with objects as tools in a serviceable 
system (enabling possiblities to be realiz-ed) gives 
intelligi~ility to the world as the realization of 
projects. 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Dasein has the inherent tendency to annihilate space, 
to extend the senses and enlarge the world, and to 
determine and organize the world, physically and 
psychologically, in terms of preoccupation. Man 
employs and modifies, extends and improves his tools 
in the pursuit of his projects, and thus actively usea 
time for the realization of his possibilities. It is2 in the way that he constitutes an intelligible world. 
It is personal existence which gives value and intelligibility 
to brute /fact. However, it must be noted that those meanings 
are projected on the inde~endently real. Existence is not 
created though its meaning is.3 
The act of knowing by which meaning is created proceeds 
from the basis of the self's concern for objects in its world 
which differentiates certain things in the stream of conscious-
ness from certain others. This part of the process can be 
compared to the effect of light on objects. The act of knowing 
(noesis), on this analogy, is like a shaft of light while the 
things-as-known (noema). are the illuminated spots. 
1Blackham, 22• £!1., P• 89 . 
2Ibid., P• 90. 
3Ibid., P• 93. 
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The central core o£ light in this simile, stands £or 
that which is directly extended, in other words, for 
the focus o£ attention: the concentric rings of the 
evanescent halo for that ~1hich is 'co-intended.' 1 
This ability o£ man o£ project himself into the world 
is possible because of his ability to transcend himself as 
actualized at the present moment. Such a characteristic 
is what it means to say that man is temporal, one of the 
major stresses of Heidegger's description. What this means, 
to quote Herbert Spiegelberg, is that: 
(The) human being in its temporality is always reaching 
out beyond itsel£, i.e., in the future which 'comes 
toward' it, that it goes back ~o its past facticity, 
and that it meets its present. 
Or, as summarized by Vycinas in his Earth ~ Gods: 
Since man is essentially a relation, he is 
constantly beyond himself in the sense that he 
· stands out into the openness o£ Being; he under-
stands and approaches himself from his beyondnesa; 
he is constantly coming to himself.) 
What happens when man no longer understands himself in 
relation to Being, when the objects of his world are no longer 
intelligible to him, is the feeling o£ meaninglessness, the 
awareness of nothingness. This is manifest in the human 
feeling of anxiety. Again, to quote Spiegelberg: 
In such a state o£ anxiety the world appears with 
the ~eculiar character of uncanniness (Unheimlich-
keit). The 'nothing' revealed by the anxiety o£ 
~ ~ Zeit thus consists of the uncanny indefinite• 
ness of the world as a whole and of our being in the 
world.4 
1Kuhn, £E• ill•, P• 137 • 
2spiegelberg, ~· cit., P• 336. 
3vycinas, £E• ill•• P• 4. 
4spiegelberg, 22• cit., p. 322. 
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With this loss of a perspective on the world comes the 
threat of loss of self because of the nature of the self-
world polarity. 
This feeling of anxiety, of nothingness, indicates, 
according to Heidegger, the limit of the metaphysical 
question. Man, because he is Being-in-the-world and an 
existent cannot penetrate to a ground of necessity for all 
existence. This brings the shocking awareness of one's 
own contingency. Man can ask a question he cannot answer. 
This nothingness which we become aware of in such a 
situation is not an entity. It is rather an event or charac-
ter which reveals Being. As one commentator put it: "against 
the background of this experience (of nothingness) Being 
stands out all the more clearly and poignantly."1 Nothingness 
should be spoken of, then, as the veil of Being or the way 
in which Being appears in contrast to particular beings. At 
least this is the more positive interpretation of the concept 
given by James Col~ins. The dread one feels in the presence 
of this nothingness is the realization of the contingency of 
all things which are not Being. This is not the terror of 
annihilation but the sense of distance and otherness from 
Being. Dread is mingled with awe. To quote Collins: 
For a sense of the deliberate absence of being is 
founded on a certain manifestation of the presence 
of being. Only because man is capable of responding 
to the call of being, is he also capable of feeling 
dread at the situation in which being reserves itself 
from that-which-is.2 
1~. 
2collins, 2£• £!!., p. 199. 
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Thus, nothingness is the powerful presence of Being to that 
other than itself. The positive significance of the experi-
ence is that it prepares the way for the experience of Being.1 
To summarize what we have said about Heidegger, the 
essential thing to remember is that his basic concern is the 
discovery of Being. Beyond the subject-object level of our 
ordinary relationships it is possible to encounter Being 
manifest through these beings and discovered most clearly 
through an analysis of the human self and its moods. It is 
in man that Being is capable of being brought to awareness 
and man can be cognizant of that which shapes his nature by 
eliciting a response. This involves a carefully worked out 
theory of the relation between the self and the world as 
that of the relation between a purposer and his tools. The 
whole concern, at least in his early writings, is so to 
analyze this experience of man in the world that Being may 
be made manifest. 
We are now at the point in our discusBion where we 
need to draw together some of the things that have been said 
in this chapter as preparation for the next part of the paper. 
After a discussion of some of the major emphases of Tillich's 
theology and its methodology, we shall move to a discussion 
of these points in the light of the phenomenological method. 
The questions we shall ask will be such as "To what extent 
does Tillich use the phenomenological method?" "At what points 
lrbid., P• 197. 
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does an understanding of phenomenology aid an understanding 
of some of the dominant thrust~ o:f Tillich1 s thinking?" In 
anticipation of this, we shall now attempt to draw together 
some of the things that we said about phenomenology in this 
chapter. These insights will be our guides in making our 
final analysis of Tillich's methodology. 
The :first point to be made by way o:f summary is the 
emphasis on the return to the nature and structures of con-
scious experience itself by eliminating as much as possible, 
prejudicial pre-suppostions such as the belief in the 
natural world as "objective" and "out there". To accurately 
investigate a thing, we must approach it with as open an 
attitude as possible, willing to see it as it gives itself 
to our awareness and thus discern those structures of a 
thing which define its essential nature. 
Secondly, :from the thought o:f Heidegger we can learn 
much about the self-world relation. We can learn to under• 
stand man as shaping and being shaped by the objects o:f the 
world and as being among other beings who is unique by 
virtue of his relation to and awareness o:f Being, the 
genuine first principle of metaphysics. It is man's search 
for Being through a hermeneutical analysis of human experi-
ence in the world which will serve as the model for much o:f 
Tillich1 s investigations. 
With this background concerning the phenomenological 
movement, we are now _ready to turn to a discussion of 
Tillich's methodology in light of the methods and procedures 
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of phenomenology. The question we shall be considering in 
this regard is whether or not a "critical" phenomenology is 
possible. Tillich maintains that an accurate analysis of 
experience pre-supposes a testing of this experience by the 
insights or a final revelation. It is his contention that 
the truths expressed by Christian theology, when understood 
from a phenomenological point of view, give us our most 
adequate picture of human existence in its basic aspects. 
However, to do this, the insights of this final revelation 
must be co- ordinated with the questions raised by the very 
nature of human existence . For an analysis of the structures 
of such experiences, including both the question or finitude 
and the answer of revelation, the phenomenological method , 
when operating within the limits of a final revelation, gives 
us the best means for gaining knowledge of .the self as under-
stood in the light of the Knowledge of God. 
CHAPTER II 
METHOD AND ONTOLOGY IN THE 
THEOLOGY OF PAUL TILLICH 
We now move from a preliminary discussion of the 
phenomenological moveme~t to a discussion of major aspects 
of Tillich1 s thought, such as his view of the human situa-
tion, the knowing process, the awareness of God, and so on. 
No explicit relation of Tillich1 s thought to the phenomeno-
logical movement will be attempted until the last chapter. 
Though it is realized that the material in the next chapter 
cannot adequately be discussed in non-phenomenological terms 
(as the argument of the thesis attempts to show), yet it 
is believed that a general. orientation to the problems and 
method involved in Tillioh1 s theology is helpful in gettir.g 
a perspective on the matter at hand. This gives us some 
data, particular aspects of which can be studied in more 
detail when major emphases of Tillich1 s thinking are inter• 
preted phenomenologically. 
For Tillich as for Heidegger, the best access to the 
nature of reality is found in the ~uman self and it is his 
contention that through an analysis of the structures found 
in the human self, we gain a clue to the structure of reality. 
Man, says Tillich, is 11 that being in whom all levels of being 
are united and approachabla. 111 The nature of man, not the 
lpaul Tillich, Systematic Theology I, (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1951}, P• 168. 
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nature or objects in the natural world is the best clue we 
have to the nature or reality. The reason ror this is that: 
Whenever man has looked at his world, he has round 
himselr in it as a part of it. But he also has 
realized that he is a stranger in the world of objects, 
unable to penetrate it beyond a certain level of 
scientific analysis. And then he has become aware 
. of the fact that be himself is the door to the deeper 
levels of reality, that in his own existence he1has the only possible approach to existence itself. 
To put it another way, man is "that being who asks the onto• 
logical question and in whose self-awareness the ontological 
answer can be found."2 One of Tillich1 s concerns will be 
to show how this is so, what kind of information about reality 
can be found in our knowledge of the self, and what implica-
tions all of this has for an interpretation of religious 
experience. 
According to Tillich, one of the things man is aware 
of when he examines his own nature is his finiteness or 
limitedness. Man. sees himself as occupying a particular 
place in space and time, being able to transcend his situa-
tion conceptually, that is, he can envision situations other 
than the one he is involved in though he ean practically (or 
actually) occupy only one situation at a time. He also 
recognizes that his present moment is suspended, as it were, 
between two forms of non-being, the no-more of the past and 
the not-yet of the future. His awareness of his tranaitori-
ness in the midst or these and other threatening factors 
1~., P• 62. 
2rbid., p. 168. 
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makes him acutely aware of, and anxious about, the possibility 
of his own death and non-being. All of these factors, which 
man is aware of when he is aware of his finitude, have onto-
logical status for Tillich. Thus, we may expect to find in 
man's self-awareness a clue to the origin of, or reason far, 
metaphysical thinking and the religious question. 
The awareness of finitude arises when one becomes aware 
of non-being. To be finite is to realize one is limited and 
has a definite end as well as to experience the power of 
being which permits one to assert his being in the midst of 
the threatening forces. Non-being is the awareness of one's 
own impotence in the face of that which is absolute being.l 
This awareness of the possibility of non-being and the pos-
sibility of submitting to the negative factors in life makes 
man acutely aware of his contingency. There seems to be 
nothing in the structures of finite experience either on 
the level of the self-world polarity or in the freedom-destiny, 
individualization-participation polarities to account for the 
existence of any of these. Thus, these structures raise a 
question which cannot be answered in terms of the structure 
itself; namely, what is the being or power of being which 
keeps that which !! from disintegrating into non-being. 
Even in asking the question concerning the basis of 
the finite order, one is aware of the power of being as well 
as the negative fact of non-being. As Tillich puts it, even 
1~ •• p. 189. 
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in the awareness of non-being, something 1! which asks the 
question.l This quest for the ground of being takes the 
form of the ontological question in philosophy as an attempt 
is made to discover cognitively or be aware of the ground 
of being or being-itself. Philosophy deals with that which 
is the structure of being, that is, the way being-itself is 
manifest through particular contingent beings. 
How does the awareness of being-itself arise? It is 
the nature of the finite structures themselves which makes 
possible man's awareness of something beyond particular 
objects or moments. Man, though limited, can transcend 
himself by conceptually moving beyond the present moment 
and thus be aware of (have as his conceptual object) the 
finitude which he himself is. This self-transcendence occurs 
in man when he is aware of a future to which he belongs but 
which he does not yet possess as present actuality. Man is 
not limited to a particular moment but can transcend himself 
and be aware of future possibilities. He can raise the ques-
tion about that which lies beyond what he presently sees and 
experiences. Man can ''transcend every finite time and every 
finite space without exception."2 
In addition to the negative fact that self-transcendence 
makes us aware of our own contingency, Tillich understands 
self-transcendence as an expression of the infinite which 
lies beyond the particular moment. This, according to him, 
1~ •• p. 190. 
21.!2.1£. & 
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t·· 
negates the negative factor in finitude by emphasizing the 
fact that nothing finite can hold man. Man can transcend 
every finite moment and reach out to the infinity of un-
realized possibilities. Because man is impelled toward the 
unot yet" of the future, this signifies, for .Tillich, the 
.fact that there exists an "indissoluble relation o.f every• 
' 
thing finite to being-itsel.f."l To put it another way, 
11being•itself manif'ests itself to finite being in the in• 
.finite drive of the finite beyond itself. 112 This is not 
to be taken to mean that being-itself is the negation of 
finitude. Being-itsel.f is a positive factor which man can 
encounter through self'-transcendence, in an experience which 
is immediate, a kind o.f "• mystical a priori', and awareness 
o.f something that transcends the cleavage between subject 
and object."3 
When man thus transcends himself and becomes aware of 
his situation he becomes anxious. Tillich says that ".finitude 
in awareness is anxiety. n4 To be finite is to be threatened 
by non-being. This creates great anxiety in the individual 
whO is aware of the situation as he fears the destruction of 
his very sel.fhood. In the face o.f non-being one reels im-
potent to do anything to insure the perpetuation o.f one's 
l ~., P• 191. 
2Ibid. 
3rbid., P• 9. 
4~., P• 191. 
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own contingent being. Thus anxiety results and the individual 
can be said to be in a state of concern, a state which can 
be described as ultimate concern because it deals with that 
which concerns one's whole being. Nothing, says Tillich, can 
be of ultimate concern to us unless it has the power of threat-
1 
ening and saving our being. The question of being-itself 
thus becomes the religious question of the power of being 
which can sustain finite existence. 
Because of the estranged nature of hum.an existence and 
man's inability to affir.m the power of being to which he es-
sentially belongs, the threat of non-being presses itself 
upon human awareness with a particular urgency. This threat 
manifests itself in three different ways. In the ontological 
realm it appears as the fear of death, the fear that finally 
one will become nothing. In the spiritual realm the threat 
of non-being manifests itself as the fear of meaninglessness. 
Finally, in the moral realm, this threat appears as the 
feeling of guilt for circumstances not entirely within one's 
control.2 All of these expressions of non-being make the 
ontological question into a religious one of the search for 
the power of being and the concern for the meaning of being 
for estranged finite existenc~. 
Thus, the quest for God is the quest for the answer 
implied in the question of human existence. This answer 
1ill,£., P• 14. 
2Paul Tillich, The Courage to Be. (New Haven: Yale 
Unitersity Press, 1961), p. 41. 
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comes through the awareness of an unconditional element in 
the self and the world. Such an element is experienced 
immediately and because it is unconditional, it cannot have 
been derived from anything on the finite level. As we noted 
earlier, this experience can occur when the self transcends 
itself, and the experience is as certain as is the self's 
own existence. 1 
The immediate awareness of the unconditional is not 
a matter of rational deduction because it precedes the subject-
object dichotomy. 
Man is immediately aware of something uncondttional 
which is the prius of the separation and interaction 
of subject and object, theoretically as well as 
practically.2 
We have thus moved from an analysis of the finite 
structures to a consideration of the question raised by this 
structure but which points beyond the structure for an answer. 
We have also seen that in the process of self-transcendence 
man encounters being-itself as an ~ediate unconditional 
element. When being-itself is encountered with one's whole 
being in a state of ultimate concern about the threat of 
non-being to the foundations of one's being, then being-itself 
appears as the power of being or that which makes it possible 
for man to be, in spite of the threats bo his being. 
We have spoken of the manifestation of being-itself 
in the midst of finitude and of the implications this has 
lPaul Tillich, The Dynamics £! Faith (New York: Harper 
& Row, 1958), P• 17. 
2Paul Tillich, TheologJ £! Culture, ed. by Robert c. · 
Ktmball (New York: Oxford On vers!ty Press, 1958), p. 22. · 
48 
for man as a threatened, existing being. We can also speak 
of this in terms of the cognitive event, that is, of the 
contingency of finite reason and its "quest" :for revelation. 
In order to understand the significance o:f what Tillich says 
in this regard, we must understand just what he means by 
knowledge. For Tillich, the rational encounter of the self 
with the world is a particular kind of event in the series 
of events which constitute the self's encounter with the 
world. One could say that it is through reason that the 
ontological question becomes conscious and it is through 
the finite rational structures that the religious question 
is articulated. 
We begin our discussion by defining what it is Tillich 
means by "reason". Reason, :for him, is "the structure of 
the mind which enables the mind to grasp and to transform 
ree.lity."l It is not simply the realm encountered by means-
end relationships or by what he calls "technical reason." 
This essential reason, which we have defined here, is 
finite and estranged under the conditions of existence. It 
therefore raises in its own way the question concerning the 
ground of being. In the realm of reason, this becomes the 
search for truth-itself through the finite human truths.2 
This is the quest for revelation paralleling the ontological 
quest for being-itsel:f. Revelation, according to Tillich, 
1Ibid. 1 P• 72e 
2~ •• p. 79. 
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is the essential nature of an ontological reason which is 
actualized in the self and the world and which is thus 
dependent on the destructive-saving structures.! 
The next question which must be raised is how or under 
what circumstances is the question of the ult~ate raised in 
regard to the way we have defined reason? Tillich has already 
pointed out that logos reason, as actualized in existence. 
is subject to the structures of finitude. It would follow 
that the questions arising from the very nature of rinite 
existence, that is 6 a search for the ground of being of all 
particular beings, would arise in the realm of finite reason. 
Man's reason, which attempt,s to grasp and comprehend the 
world must face the fact that all finite perspectives are 
limited and that this limitation means that no particular 
system or idea is rinal. No particular truth is truth-itself. 
Human reason, then, is limited. However, as man ap-
proaches the limits of his knowledge and realizes the contin-
gent and fragmentary nature of his knowing, he becomes aware 
of a mystery which surrounds that which he has succeeded in 
making intelligible by the usual structures of rationality, 
such as the subject-object order and the categories. The 
structures of reason, as do the structures of finite exist-
ence, point to something which is not explicable in terms of 
the structures themselves. This something else is what 
Tillich means by the "depth" of reason. 
lrbid., P• ·74. 
-
The "depth" o£ reason is de£ined by Tillich as £ollows: 
The depth o£ reason is the expression o£ some-
thing that is not reason but which precedes reason 
and is mani£est through it. Reason in both its 
objective and its subjective structures points to 
something which appears in these structures but which 
transcends them in power and n:e aning.l 
This depth o£ reason is not openly manifest in reason 
as actualized because o£ the estranged nature of human existence. 
Thus, though the condition of reason points to the depth mani-
fest through it, at the same time the essential nature is hidden 
because estrangement indicates both a separation from and a 
union with that to which it essentially belongs. This fallen 
state of reason is indicated by the presence o£ myth and cult. 2 
Reason, as it is commonly manifest, is no longer able to point 
directly to its depth and a need arises for a nspecial 11 form 
of discourse; namely, myth and cult. This existential pre-
dicament of reason brings about the quest for revelation and 
the need for the overco~ing of _estrangement and reason's re~ 
unification with its own depth. 
Reason needs to be 11healed", that is, have its estrange-
ment overcome just as much as do the other finite structures. 
This can be done only by revelation which Tillich defines as 
11 the manifestation of the ground of being for human knowledge.u3 
We shall postpone a more complete discussion of the nature of 
revelation until after we have considered what it is about 
the nature of reason which can make "healing" possible. To 
lrbid., p. 79. 
2Ibid. 1 p. 80. 
3~., p. 94. 
51 
do the latter, we must review briefly what Tillich means by 
the ontological structure of knowledge. 
The first thing to be noted in this regard is that 
knowledge is a form of union. "In every act of knowledge the 
knower and that which is known are united; the gap between 
subject and object is overcome."l Finite reason thus mani-
fasts itself through such polarities as those of individual-
ization-participation. 
This structure is important to a consideration of know-
ledge as a combination of unity and distance. The knower 
must be in some way removed from or other than the object, 
for knowing means, by definition, to have an object before 
the mind.2 To look at a thing, and to know a thing means 
to be separated from it. However, if there were nothing but 
separation, there could not be knowledge. The mind must 
identify the objects before it, there must be some corre~ 
spondence between the mind and reality or nothing can be 
known. The unity of knower and known is possible because 
though 11 the particular objects is strange as such ••• it con• 
tains essential structures with which the cognitive subject 
is essentially united and which it can remember when looking 
at things. 11 3 
The term Tillich uses to describe the knowing process 
is 11encounter". This is consistent with the idea of polar 
relationships (subject-object, individualization-participation} 
1~. 
2~., P• 94. 
31£!g., PP• 94-95. 
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because it implies a coming together from both sides. Knowing 
is not, then, either the impressions of objects on a passive 
intellect nor is the world simply a mental creation. Rather, 
in knowing both object and knower meet and each 11 influences" 
the other. This means that both the subject and the object 
must be "open11 for one another. The object must give itself 
and the subject must receive it. This is true not just of 
religious knowledge but of all kinds of knowledge, including 
the scientific. 
Thus, knowledge requires an "openness to receive that 
with which one unites."l Because of the polarity of the 
knowing process and the reciprocal relationship between 
knower arid known, it .follows that nmuch depends on the object 
with which it (the knower) unites."2 This latter statement 
makes it possible for us to understand how revela.tion can 
have a "healing" .function in the sense of being efficacious 
to overcome estrangement. Knowledge can have a transforming 
function, if the thing with which one unites (or knows) is 
the power of being as manifest in revelation. Thus, the 
history of revelation and the history of salvation are the 
same.3 
To return to the nature of revelation, Tillich defines 
it as uthe manifestation of something hidden which cannot be 
approached through ordinary ways of gaining knowledge."4 
1 ~., P• 95. 
2Ibid., P• 96. 
3~., p. 144. 
4~., P• 108. 
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This refers to what we said earlier about the mystery 
encountered at the limits of ordinary knowledge. This 
mystery is contradictory to the attitude of finite cognition 
and 'precedes' the subject-object relation.l However, mystery 
is always experienced through finite objects and through terms 
and objects in the subject-object structure. However, the 
mystery which is manifest through these structures always 
transcends the ordinary context of experience in which it is 
encountered. Genuine mystery appears only when reason is 
driven beyond itself to its own 1 ground 1 .2 The positive side 
of this mystery is the power of being appearing as our ulti-
mate concern and manifesting itself in symbols and myths. 
It must be kept in mind that revelation has both a 
subjective side and an objective side in interdependence. 
(This parallels the subjective-objective sides of reason.) 
On the subjective side, revelation refers to the person who 
is 'grasped' by this particular manifestation of reality. 
The objective side, on the other hand, is the thing that 
does the 1 grasping 1 .3 In order that revelation can occur 
there must be both an event that occurs (a revelation that 
is given) and a person who receives the event as revelation. 
When mystery is revealed, the mind that is grasped by 
the revelation experiences "ecstasy". This is in opposition 
1~. 
2Ibid., PP• 109-110. 
3rug., P• 111. 
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to the experience one has when reason is driven to its 
boundary, the abyss of possible non-being and an 'ontological 
shock' results. Ecstasy goes beyond this to a positive 
affirmation. As Tillich phrases it: 
Ecstasy unites the experience of the abyss to which 
reason in all its functions is driven with the 
experience of the ground in which reason is grasped 
by the mystery of its own depth and of the depth of 
being generally. 
The objective manifestation of the revelation which occasions 
ecstasy is miracle, or an event which points to the mystery 
of being. 
The experience of the depth of reason as a mystery or 
power of being preceding the rational structures does not 
destroy the rational structure of the mind. The reason for 
this is that reason and depth of reason refer to two different 
dimensions of reality.2 In order for the depth of reason to 
be irrational or to destroy reason it would have to be an 
antagonistic force on reason's own level. This is not the 
case. However, the depth of reason, though qualitatively 
different from finite reason nevertheless can be manifest 
only through this structure. 
Revelation can only be communicated to those who part-
icipate in the situation of revelation. Otherwise, finite 
objects or words subject to the subject-object structure of 
finitude fail to point beyond themselves. When an attempt 
1~., P• 113. 
2rbid., p. 117. 
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is made to use them as religious symbols and the persons 
involved are not participating in the revelatory situation, 
there is literally nothing for them to refer to at this time. 
The criterion for determining whether a given object 
or term is performing a symbolic function is to determine to 
what degree the symbol is transparent to the mystery it 
reveals. Unless the finite object points beyond itself to 
its own ultimate ground, it is not a symbol. By this cri-
terion, according to Tillich, Jesus Christ is the final 
revelation because he alone is completely transparent to the 
mystery he reveals.l 
Why is symbolic knowledge so basic2 Tillich has said 
that the only non-symbolic statement we cen make about God 
is that he is being-itself. All other statements such as 
"God is personal", "God is love", etc. must be symbolic. 
By a symbol is meant a statement which refers beyond itself,2 
that is, indicates a type of reality other than, though 
expressed through, finite objects or terms. This symbolic 
discourse is the only way one can speak of being-itself or 
God because of the estranged nature of human reason and 
existence and its separation from its own ground and depth. 
Edward Farley, writing in his book, The Transcendence of God 
points out that the necessity for symbolic speaking is rooted 
in the very nature of the subject-object structure. "All 
language is conditioned by its participation in the subject-
lrbid., p. 133. 
2
_flli., P• 238. 
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object structure; thus language can never apply directly 
to anything beyond it."l (italics mine). However, one can 
speak of God as being-itself if one uses the term carefully 
and is aware of just what is being said by the term. Farley 
puts it this way: 
Tillich is not applying being-itself to God as one 
would apply a name to an object or an adjective to 
a noun •••• This would be subject-object language, and 
neither subject-object categories nor the way of 
applying them is possible at this level. Being• 
itself is Tillich's concept which denotes whatever-
it-is which is not subject to the world of polarities 
and finitude.2 
Fromthis, according to Farley, it ean easily be seen why one 
cannot apply the adjective "personal" to God in a literal 
sense. "Personality", says Farley, 11 is always rooted in 
individuality which is a pole of one of the polarities.") 
Thus, such statements must always be symbolic. 
A symbol, as Tillich describes it, is a concrete state-
ment or image which uses a segment of finite reality (something 
found within the subject~object level of things) to refer to 
God. How is this possible? It is possible "because that 
which is infinite is being-itself and because everything part-
icipates in being-itself."4 
Everything which is, has being. The ontological question 
is concerned with discovering just what it means to say that 
something has being. The oo ntingency of the finite order makes 
lEdward Farley, The Transcendence Qf God (Philadelphia: 
The Westmanster Press, 1960), P• 84. 
2rbid., P• 87. 
3rbid., p. 84. 
-
4'I'illich, Systematic Theology I, P• 239. 
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it imperative that we look beyond the order ror the ground 
of what we observe. It is their participation in being-
itself that makes it possible forftnite objects to point 
beyond themselves to their own ultimate ground. Though 
rinite objects are difrerent rrom their ground and are 
estranged from it, this estrangement is never complete and 
always exists in a polar relationship to partictpation. 
In a religious sense, the importance or a symbolic 
knowledge of being-itself is not just as a cognitive aware-
ness but is the experience of the power of being which makes 
it possible for estrangement to be overcome. Thus, a religious 
symbol, to be erfective, must participate in the power of the 
divine to which it points.l In order to be efficacious, a 
symbol must not only open up a dimension of reality not acces-
sible to other realms or discourse and thereby participate 
in the power of the thing to whioh it points but it must also 
open up a new level or reality in the human self. Symbols 
have a two-edged nature.2 This is essential because symbols, 
as a mediator of the ultimate, must be a part or bot·h the 
revelatory and the receiving aspects of the process. However, 
in order to be a part of the latter, it must be presupposed 
that before a symbol can be valid for a person, he must part-
icipate in the religious reality being symbolized.) 
libid., P• 239. 
2~., P• 240. 
3Paul Tillich "The Problem of Theological Method" rrom 
The Journal of Religion, Jan. 1947 reprinted in Four Existen• 
llil Theolograns ed. by Will Herberg (G·arden City, N.J.: 
Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1958), P• 242. 
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How are we to determine the nature of this reality 
which religious statements point to~ To answer this question 
we must consider not only the reality itself but the method 
by which we know it. We are therefore ready to consider the 
explicit statement of Tillich's method which he calls 'critical 
phenomenology'. Tillich calls his method this because he 
wishes to unite the "intuitive-descriptive" aspect of the 
phenomenological method of Husserl with the "existential-
critical" emphasis of the existentialists. 1 He feels that 
the phenomenological method, though an important technique 
in theological investigations leaves one critical question 
unanswered, namely "Where, and to whom, is an idea revealed?" 
How do we choose the example to be phenomenologically analyzed? 
It is certainly legitimate to inquire about the universal 
meaning of revelation manifest in a revelatory event but this 
is not completely adequate to the theological situation until 
one asks about the person to whom the revelation is given.2 
This approach will lead him to develop what he calls the 
method of correlation as the attempt to relate theological 
answers (or meanings) with the questions raised in existence. 
Here we see another kind of polarity (i.e. question-answer) 
which must be added to those of self-world, individualization-
participation. 
Just what is the method of correlation? The method of 
correlation stresses the strict interdependence of existential 
lTillich, Systematic Theology 1, p. 101. 
2 ill.E•, P• 106. 
59 
questions and theological answers. We had a hint of this 
when we noted Tillich1 s contention that the very structure 
of finite existence raises a question about its own source 
and ground which cannot be answered by any element taken 
from within the structure itself. The answer to the question 
cannot be derived from the question, otherwise it would not 
really be an answer. The question is finitude and this cannot 
be answered by reference to another finite thing. However, 
unless the question (finitude) somehow participated in the 
answer (being-itself). the answer would not really be an 
answer to the question. 
Such a view leads someone like Edward Farley to conclude 
that the clue to the method of correlation is the concept of 
participation-estrangement. 
Because even in estrangement man participates in his 
ground, the salvation that comes to him is not something 
strange to his being. It really is addressed toward 
man, which means toward his questions. Such 'questions' 
are not merely verbal formulations but questions that 
cohere in man's existence, since man's 'very being is 
the question of his existence 1 • 11 1 
If one is to explain the method of correlation in terms 
of the participation-estrangement polarities, it is easy to 
understand Tillich1 s point that method and system determine 
each other. 2 In dealing with ree.lity in terms of polar con-
cepts, one cannot make an assertion without its having implica-
tions for the opposite pole. The theological answer, for 
1Farley, 2£• 211•• P• 100. 
2Tillich6 Systematic Theology 1, P• 60. 
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example, is always partially conditioned by the form in which 
the question is raised. On the other hand, the theological 
answer can transform, as it were, the finite categories and 
make it possible for them to mediate the answer. 
Because method and system stand in polar relation to 
one another due to the very structure of human existence 
(self-world) and human knowing (subject-object), no method 
is adequate for every kind of inquiry. The method is a part 
of the reality being dealt with by virtue of the fact that 
the method can shape and thereeore distort a given reality 
if it is inadequate to the subject. To restate the point in 
a slightly different way, the cognitive relation reveals 
something about the object as well as the subject. Therefore, 
no method can be developed without a prior knowledge of the 
object.1 
Knowledge depends on its object. There are realms 
of reality or--more exactly--of abstractions from 
reality in which the most complete detachment is the 
most adequate cognitive approaeh •••• But it is most 
inadequate to apply the same approach to reality in 
its infinite concreteness.2 
Therefore, in order to de~l with religious experience, 
we can eliminate immediately any method which would distort 
the data or which would make a legitimate asking of the 
religious question impossible. Tillich would say that the 
1~. 
2Tillich, The Courage to ~~ p. 124. 
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method needful is the phenomenological one which aims to 
"describe 'meanings', disregarding, for the time being, the 
question of the reality to which they refer.nl Tillich 
describes his phenomenological method as follows: 
The test of a phenomenological description is that 
the picture given by it is convincing, that it can be 
seen by anyone who is willing to look in the same 
direction, that the description illuminates other 
related ideas, and that it makes the reality which 
these ideas are supposed to reflect understandable. 
Phenomenology is a way of pointing to the phenomena 
as they 'give themselves', without the interference 
of negative or positive prejudices and explanations.2 
This method is needed, for Tillich, because religious 
objects are not objects in the ordinary sense of the word; 
they are not subject to the subject-object structure though 
they are expressed through it. What religion deals with, 
then, is not so much an object as it is a qualitz of experience. 
Therefore, we should substitute the question "What does the 
'holy' mean?" for the question "Does God exist'l"3 The !holy', 
says Tillich, is an important cognitive doorway to the nature 
of religion. The holy is an immediately experienced phenomena 
and has unique structures which can be studied phenomeno-
logically. The 'holy' is "the guality of that which concerns 
man ultimately."4 It is a quality experienced through objects 
though it is not itself an object. The only reason that it 
lTillich, Systematic Theology ! 1 p. 106. 
2~. 
3rbid., p. 43. 
4rbid., P• 215. 
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appears as a separate order of experience is because of the 
estranged condition of existence (the separation of existence 
from its own depth or ground) . l 
The 'holy' as "the gualit:y of that which concerns man 
ultimatelyn can be experienced only in the attitude of sur-
render and participation.2 "Man cannot speak of the gods 
in detachment , "3 otherwise they become just another object 
in a world of objects . As Tillich puts it: 
There is no meaningful speaking of God if he is taken 
as an object which is not, at the same time , the ground 
of the speaking about him. There is no meaningful 
speaking of God except in an existential attitude or 
in the situation of revelation. In any other attitude 
the religious word •God' is used after it has been 
deprived of its genuine , namely , its religious meaning . 4 
For Tillich, God is ttthe answer to the question implied in 
man's finitude; he is the name for that which concerns man 
ultimately. n5 Or , to put it ano t her way, God is "the re-
ligious word for what is called the ground of being . »6 God 
is that which makes it possible for us to have the courage 
to assert our finite being in the midst of all the things 
that threaten it . 
1~ •• p . 216 . 
2~ •• p . 44. 
3rbid., p . 214. 
4Tillioh, "The Problem of Theological Method", p . 251 . 
5Tillioh, S:ystematic Theo1og:y f, p . 211 . 
6 . 
rug., P • 156 . 
CHAPTER 3 
TILLICH AS PHENOMENOLOGIST 
With this preliminary discussion of the main elements 
of Tillich1 s thought before us, we are now ready to get to 
the heart of the matter, namely, a discussion of Tillich as 
a phenomenologist. The parallels between certain aspects 
of Tillich's thought and phenomenology are not hard to find. 
In fact, when Tillich speaks of his own method of under• 
taking theological inquiry in the first volume of his 
Systematic Theolosy he calls his method •critical phenomen-
ology•.! According to him, phenomenology is the best method 
available for an investigation of the subject matter involved. 
The first task of theology must be to see what its concepts 
~ and to determine what aspects of our experience such 
concepts illuminate or explain. This is the prior question 
to be dealt with, not the question concerning the existence 
of nonexistence of God. 
In order to carry out this task of determining what 
theological concepts mean Tillich says at one point, somewhat 
reminiscent of Heideg'ger, that we must be aware that "one of 
the important tasks of theology is to regain the genuine 
power of classical terms by looking at the original encounter 
of mind and reality which created them.u2 
lTillich, Systematic Theology ~~ p. 106. 
2Ibid., II, PP• 12•20. 
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Phenomenology, accordingly, is desirable as a method 
because its main purpose is to describe 'meanings•, disre-
garding momentarily the question of the reality to which 
they refer . l This sounds very much like Husserl 1 s approach 
to experience. We must 1bracket 1 the natural standpoint 
and with it all concern about "external" re,ality ••• We must 
focus instead on ~ experience, on pure consciousness for 
it is here that things are present to us. Phenomena, as 
presented, have certain stable structures (which make a 
thing what it is and not another thing) and these stt•uctures 
can be carefully studied . When studied in this way, they 
reveal a kind of certain knowledge of phenomena ~ present 
to us . It is these essences or structures of which the mind 
is aware and which give meaning (intelligibility) to the 
flux of things in consciousness. 
If it can be established that the religious phenomenon 
has its own unique structure that can be studied, this will 
give us another clue to the nature of the world as presented 
to us . Tillich would agree, I think, that we must begin~ 
our experience as this is · the only vantage point from which 
our world can be viewed. Analysis of the structure of re-
ligious experience and what it implies may give us our most 
valuable insight concerning the nature of reality. Thus, 
the way in which Husserl proposed to deal with the phenomena 
present to consciousness seems to be the method Tillich uses 
lsystematic Theology I, p. 106. 
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to investigate the structures and meaning of religious 
experience. His definition of phenomenology is, at many 
points, reminiscent of Husser!: 
The test of a phenomenological description is 
that the picture given by it is convincing, that it 
can be seen by anyone who is willing to look in the 
same direction, that the description illuminates 
other related ideas, and that it makes the reality 
which these ideas are supposed to reflect under-
standable. Phenomenology is a way of pointing to 
phenomena as they 'give themselves', without the 
interference of negative or positive prejudices and 
explanations.! 
However, according to Tillich, there is an element 
missing in this intuitive-descriptive approach of Husserl 
which must be added if phenomenology is to be adequate for 
theological purposes. This element is the acknowledgment 
of where and to whom an idea is revealed.2 
At this point Tillich begins to move away from Husserl 
and closer to Heidegger and his concern for the questions of 
experience. However, Tillich is not just ' interested in 
describing the structures of human being as an indicator of 
Being (the goal of thought and existence) though this is a 
very important part of his thought as we shall indicate 
later, but he is concerned to interpret the special histor-
ical nature of the Christian faith and its unique revelation, 
by means of a phenomenological analysis of experience. Thus, 
for him, the critical factor which must be introduced into 
the phenomenological method is an awareness of a final 
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revelation by which all other revelations are ~o be judged.l 
The starting point is not just human existence but human 
existence as seen in light of the essential meaning of what 
is manifest in Christian religious experience. Thus, Till ich 
descr i bes his method as 'critical' phenomenology which com-
bines the intuitive-descriptive element of Husserl's approach 
with Heidegger•s hermeneutics of experience but in the light 
of Christian revelation. What Tillich means by revelation 
and the role this has in his phenomenology will be discussed 
in the course of the next several pages. 
But first, we must discuss the starting point of 
Tillich1 s methodological approach. What experience or series 
of events shape the form in which his system is cast~ There 
are two possible answers to this question: the immediate 
experience of God or the phenomenological ~alysis of the 
structure of the self. From what he says in section A, 
Part II of Systematic Theology I, "Basic Ontological Struc-
tures", the latter would have to be the case. It is his 
argument in this section which will be used to supp9rt our 
claim that Tillich uses the phenomenological method to arrive 
at an ontology. One gets the impression here that he is 
analyzing the finite nature of man and comes out at the end 
of the process with the need to posit Being-itself as the 
support or ground of that which is. In a sense, this is 
quite true. The concept of Being-itself is the result, as 
libid., p. 107. 
67 
it were, of an involved methodological procedure of conceptual 
analysis. However, Tillich is not starting out from the self, 
following a certain kind of methodological procedure and 
coming out with Being-itself as a conclusion which could not 
have been foreseen prior t~ the latter stages of investiga-
tion. Rather, his conclusion is already, in a sense, evident 
to him when he begins his analysis and the result of his 
investigation only makes this conclusion and its implications 
explicit. 
To be specific, the starting point of Tillich's thinking 
is the religious experience of God. 11 There must be ••• an 
immediate participation in religious reality, preceding any 
theological analysis of reality as a whole. "1 "Symbolically 
speaking, God answers man's questions, and under the impact 
.£!God's answers~~ them"2 (italics mine). Here one 
encounters an unconditional element which cannot be explained 
by finite terms used in their ordinary sense. This experience 
of the unconditional leads man to analyze his experience in 
light of his confrontation with God (to speak symbolically) 
and to see his life in the light of the insights gained from 
such an encounter. ("The answers implied in the event of 
revelation are meaningful only in so far as they are in 
correlation with questions concerning the whole of our exist-
ence, with existential questions.")) In this sense, Tillich's 
l.f.B!£., P• 43. 
2_fill., P• 61. 
Jill£. 
68 
analysis of the human condition is done retrospectively. 
The question is analyzed in light of the answer . 
However , the opposite is also the case as Tillich 
points out . Man's awareness of the ·answer is conditioned 
by or expressed in terms of a given situation. ("The 
questions implied in human existence determine the meaning 
and the theological interpretation of the answers as they 
appear in the classical religious concepts . "l) This makes 
the question of a starting point problematic. What we have 
is not strictly speaking a human condition being progressively 
articulated and at the end of a certain syllogistic or tem-
poral sequence an answer is given and the process is completed. 
Rather , we have a question- answer interpenetration at all 
levels . As Tillich puts it , though God is the answer to the 
question implied in finitude, 2 yet this ~uestion itself could 
not have been raised without admitting the presence of God 
even in the midst of the asking . 3 Just what this means will 
be examined more carefully later. 
It still seems necessary to regard the religious 
experience of God (however this may be defined) as the factor 
which makes possible the ontological question and therefore 
serves as the starting point and st~ulus for Tillich's sub-
sequent thinking . Several commen~s in Systematic Theology l 
lTillich, "The Problem of Theological Method" , p . 253. 
2systematic Theology !, P• 163 . 
3rbid., P• 206. 
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make this clear. For example, the section on the "Basic 
Ontological Structure" is introduced by a discussion opening 
with the statement that God is the answer to the question 
implied in being.l _ Another direct statement to this effect 
is found in the opening statements of the book when he speaks 
about theology as based upon a 'mystical a priori' 1 "an 
awareness of something that transcends the cleavage between 
subject and object . "2 The relation of this to philosophy 
is made explicit later in the book when he states that "the 
openness of being-itself, which is given in the basic re-
ligious experience, is the foundation for the philosophical 
grasp of the structure of being . "3 
Here is what seems to be the case: in religious ex-
perience we are immediately ttaware" of an unconditional 
element (later designated as Being•itself in ontological 
terms) which we symbolically refer to as God . 4 The sig-
nificance of this experience , in Tillich's interpretation, 
is that it gives man the courage to affirm his being in the 
1~., P• 163. 
2Ibid. , P• 9. 
3~. , p . 235 . 
4This interpretation is shared by Kenneth Hamilton in 
his ~ System~ 1E! Gospel . Hamilton says: ·~started my 
scrutiny of Tillich' s concept of being-itself with the 
motive of discovering what kind of God it could be that 
could be caught in a net of ontological analysis. The result 
of my short inquiry appears to be that in Tillich's ~ystem 
philosophical demonstration is subordinated to 'theological ' 
conviction, with the result that the philosopher who wields 
the net turns out to be a metaphysical theologian •••• The God 
who appears in the system has his nature laid down in advance 
by the requirements of a theologf resting upon the belief that 
mankind is conscious of a 'power and rests upon a 'ground' 
which reveals itself so directly that it cannot be denied. " 
PP • 86-87. 
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midst of all that threatens it. Thus God (the religious 
symbol for Being-itself) is experienced as that which has 
the power of saving or threatening man's being and is thus 
of ultimate concern to him. 
Granted that man experiences God (Being-itself), what 
does this tell us about human nature? What about man makes 
it possible for him to experience the unconditional? What 
is the significance of such an experience for the whole of 
man's being? To answer these questions, Tillich relies on 
a phenomenological analysis of the human self and its ex-
perience. 
The starting point of this method is the fact of being. 
Once this basic awareness of the fact of being is made ex-
plicit, Tillich begins to articulate the way in which being 
is manifest and related to the self. It is our contention 
in this chapter that this part of Tillich's thought is not 
completely intelligible unless it is interpreted in pheno-
menological terms. He begins by stating that the self is 
related to a world and that the self-world polarity is the 
basic articulation of the evident fact of being. According 
to Tillich, how do I know this? The answer is that when I 
analyze what is tmmediately present to consciousness I dis-
cover that consciousness is intentional. Whenever I think 
or perceive I have an object before me. Awareness always 
has a particular content; I am aware of something. This 
means, for Tillich, that I have a world or realm of objects 
to which I am related before I begin thinking about it. 
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Self and world are polar concepts. Without the self there 
would be no world (the phenomenological idea of the self as 
furnishing the intelligibility of meaningful structure by 
which the data present to the self becomes a world} and, 
corr·e spondingly, without the world there would be no content 
for consciousness. In fact, there would not be a self at 
all without the world for the self's awareness of itself is 
intimately linked to its consciousness of the world and its 
seeing itself as a .part of this world. 
When man looks at his world, he looks at himself 
as an infinitely small part of his world. Although 
he is the perspective-center, he becomes a particle 
of what is centered in him, a particle of the universe . 
This structure enables man to encounter himself . l 
Because man has (is in) a world and because he is aware 
of his participation in it, he can ask the ontological ques • 
tion concerning the nature ·of being . Man is a being md is 
aware that he has being and thus can articulate what this 
means. Furthermore (and this is where Heidegger 1 s influence 
on Tillich is apparent), it is in man's self-awareness that 
the answer to the ontological question ("W'hat does it mean 
~ ~? 11 ) can be found . 2 This last point cannot be stressed 
enough for it seems to support our contention that to under-
stand the Tillichian system is to see it in light of the 
phenomenological method. This conclusion is substantiated 
by several references to man's immediate awareness, man as 
libid. , P• 171. 
2~., p. 168 . 
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experiencing himself, man as participating in the world 
through his rational structure , and so on. For example, 
Tillich states that all beings participate in the structure 
of being (if a thing is, i.e., has being, it participates 
in what it means to be) but only man is immediately aware 
of this structure. It is in man's self-awareness, not by 
observation of the external world or deductions from rational 
first principles, that we understand the nature of the world, 
that is, the world as presented to us. Man cannot understand 
the nature of the being he himself is by analyzing objects 
in the external world because he is estranged from them, to 
use Tillich' s term. Man is "aware that he himself is the 
door to the deeper levels of reality, that in his own e.xist-
ence he has the only possible approach to existence itself" 
and "the immediate experience of one's own existence reveals 
something of the nature of existence generally."l Therefore, 
whatever knowledge of being that we have must be derived from 
an explicit analysis of our self.-awareness. This is possible, 
for Tillich, because he views man as "that being in whom all 
leveis of being are uni ted and approachable."2 Or, to use 
Heidegger's terminology, man is "Dasein", the place where 
the structure of being is manifest. In man's awareness, he 
has an immediate experience of the structure of being. 
However, man's awareness of himself as manifesting the 
ontological nature of reality, is not easily attained. We 
l_!lli. 1 P• 62. 
2Ibid., P• 168. 
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are not dealing with a simple kind or introspection but 
l-Tith a process requiring a very precise kind of inquiry. 
Man, says Tillich, is the most dirficult object .encountered 
in the cognitive process. 1 
Though Tillich does not elaborate directly on what he 
means by this# the meaning is clear when we think in terms 
of the phenomenological analysis. To discover the things 
themselves, the immediately given (in this case, the nature 
of the world as manifest in human consciousness) without 
becoming entangled in problematic or distorting presupposi-
tions is no easy task. What is immediately given, para-
doxical as it may seem, is hidden by false presuppositions 
as, for example, the uncritical assumption that there is an 
external world existing independently of all human awareness. 
However, as difficult as the process is, man can become 
aware of what is immediately present in consciousness. He 
can be aware of it because he lives in them and acts through 
them. The structures of what is immediately present is found 
in man himself, not in objects.2 
What is the nature of this structure present to im-
mediate awareness and which gives us our clues to the nature 
of the world? First or all, "man experiences himself as 
having a world to which he belongs. 11 3 By world is meant 
1~., P• 169. 
2~. 
3~. 
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ua structure or unity of manifoldness", in the sense in 
which Husserl used the term. The world is one, at least 
in so far as it is related to us perspectively.! This 
is one of the insights of the phenomenologists, as well 
as William James, who pointed out that the self has an 
active role in creating its world, that is, making into an 
intelligible whole {the meaning of 11world 11 ) what is presented 
to it. 
The words t1experience himself as" in the previous para-
graph require a phenomenological interpretation. This kind 
of relatedness of which man can become aware is implied in 
every experience. This is what the phenomenologists mean by 
the intentionality of consciousness. There are no subjects 
apart from their relation to objects and no ·objects without 
subjects. Man-world, subject-object, are polar concepts 
which means that if one side of the relation is lost, both 
sides are. When man dies, he loses his world. 
Thus, self-relatedness is a part of the structure man 
can phenomenologically discover because to be a man (ego-self) 
is to be related to objects constituting a world. However , 
man is not only aware of his relatedness to things, he is 
also aware of his separation from them. "Being a self means 
being separated in some way from everything else 11 though 
being aware, Tillich goes on to say, that at the same time 
one is aware that he belongs to that at which he looks. 2 
1~., P• 170. 
2rbid. 
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In addition to the self-world polarity, then, we can speak 
of such polarities as individualization-participation. Man 
belongs to his world yet is separated from it . The latter 
fact makes it possible for him to be aware of himself and 
therefore aware of himself as living in and through the 
structures of being . 
Man, unlike the objects in his world, is not bound to 
the things with which he is presently interacting . Man can 
transcend the objects immediately present and can view him-
self in relation to them. Man is not only aware that he is 
related to objects but aware that he is aware . This not 
only gives him clues to the reality whose structure is pre-
sent in his awareness but it makes it possible for him to 
grasp and shape his world according to universal norms and 
ideas . Through the power of language, man uses universal 
concepts which liberate him from bondage to the particular.l 
These universal concepts make it possible for him to have a 
world. 
This self-world polarity, which is one of the key 
concepts in the thinking of such phenomenologists as Heidegger 
and Merleau-Ponty, is basic to Tillich's thinking . He speaks 
in terms of polarities at a number of levels: self-world, 
subject-object, dynamics-form, finitude - Being itself and so 
on. This concept of polar relations in all man does and is 
is also important later when Tillich speaks of God as being 
revealed only to a situation of ultimate concern. This too 
is a kind of polarity. 
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The reason why polar concepts are so important. is 
that a phenomenological analysis of what is present to 
consciousness indicates that all things exist in just such 
relations. No man, no world; no situation of ultimate con-
cern. no experience of God. The reason for this intimate 
connection between man and that to which he is related can 
in many ways be described by reference to the nature of 
reason. This is particularly true in the case of the self-
world polarity. Reason, says Tillich in a way reminiscent 
of the phenomenologists, is the logos of being or that which 
makes the self a centered whole and the world a structured 
whole. 
Thus, the self can be spoken of as 'subjective reason' 
and the world as 'objective reason•. One cannot exist with-
out the other. Reason is a basic connecting link between 
man and the world. As Tillich puts it: "Man participates 
in the universe through the rational structure of mind and 
ree.lity."l Reality has a logos character otherwise it would 
not be known (i.e. intelligible to man). Tillich does not 
go so far as to say that the world has no intelligibility 
apart from the meaning the self bestows upon it but he does 
say that there is a strict correlation between man's reason 
and the logos character of the world. However, in some ways 
he is walking a narrow line at this point because when 
speaking of the categories he calls them "the forms in which 
libid.' p. 192. 
77 
the mind grasps and shapes reality."l These are ontological 
categories because they are our only way of experiencing 
reality. It follows that reality, to be experienced, must 
have these categories. The element that prevents this from 
becoming a kind of s ubjectivism is Tillich1 s concept of 
polarities in which we have not two absolute distinctions 
but two aspects of a single relation. Thus, the ttobjective" 
structure of the world is the world as viewed through the 
finite categories. One does not exist without the other. 
This, too, is particularly problematic when not viewed 
phenomenologically. The phenomenologist reminds us that 
we have only one perspective and whatever knowledge of the 
world we have must be gained from this pole of the self. 
However, unless the corresponding pole were in some sense 
present, the whole process would be meaningless and in fact 
non-existent. 
To return to our discussion of reason, understood as 
present in both aspects of the self-world polarity in a 
corresponding way, it is man's power of reasoning using 
universal concepts, which makes it possible for him to trans-
cend his particular situation. The capacity for self-trans-
cendence has major implications for the knowledge of God 
{or Being itself). Because man can transcend himself, pheno-
menological analysis reveals the polarity of dynamics 
{vitality) and form (intentionality). Man as dynamic is 
open in all directions, ever reaching beyond nature and 
lrbid., p. 192. 
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capable or doing this without limitation. However, a 
limiting factor is introduced in the concept of form which 
means man is related to meaningful structures, lives in 
universals and is capable of grasping and shaping reality.l 
The grasping function of reason is the receiving aspect or 
that which encounters the structure or the world. These 
elements are in turn 'shaped' by subjective reason thus 
transforming the given material into a Gestalt or world. 
The situation is a polar one: "We transform reality according 
to the way we see it, and we see reality according to the 
way we transrorm it . "2 Dynamics is the force which makes 
man transcend himself and makes him aware of his almost 
unlimited possibilities. However, the possibilities always 
occur within a meaningful structure thereby imposing a form 
on them. Thus, man is a being who can transcend any given 
particular.3 but cannot transcend the structures themselves. 
In fact, the structures of finitude (dynamics-form) literally 
force man to transcend himself. If he uses reason he is 
beyond the immediate situation. ~an's vitality is united 
with an essentially unlimited int-entionality."4 
There is one factor, however, which modifies this self-
transcending situation, making man aware of his limits and 
his contingency. This problem is: granted that man is trans-
cendent, how is it possible for him to err? Why is it that 
1~ •• p. 180. 
2Ibid., P• 76. 
3Ibid., P• 186. 
4Ibid., 
-
P• 190. 
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one's expectations concerning a state of affairs are sometimes 
disappointed~ The explanation Tillich accepts is the onto-
logical character of non-being. This is a problematic concept 
in Tillich and needs to be discussed quite carefully. 
First of all• non-being, for Tillich, must be understood 
dialectically, that is, in relation to Being . Non-being in 
negative theology, he goes on to say, means "being beyond 
every concrete predicate"; in other words, being everything 
or being-itself.l This is quite similar to Heidegger's inter-
pretation of the term. The problem is that this not-being 
anything in particular can be interpreted only negatively 
and thus becomes the occasion for despair as it does in much 
existentialism where no way of escaping non-being as meaning-
less is appar nt . 
However. Being-itself is a positive as well as a 
negative quality. It is the ground of being as well as the 
abyss . Kenneth Hamilton in his !a! System and the Gospel 
describes this two-fold relation as follows: 
Its usefulness (the concept of being-itself as the 
'creative and abysmal ground of being') is that it 
indicates how being- itself has a two-fold relation 
to all things that have being (~ . that are beings) . 
Being- itself transcends all things both positively 
and negatively . Positively speaking, all things have 
what being they possess because they participate in 
being, eo that being- itself upholds them. Negatively 
speaking , all things lack the full being of being-
itself, so that the absoluteness of the latter seems 
to blot out the merely relative being of everything 
except itself.2 
libid., P• 188. 
-
2Kenneth Hamilton, The Sffstem and the Gospel , (New York: 
The Macmillan Co . , 1963) ,-p: 9 • 
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Thus, the dialectical problem or non-being is the 
problem of f1nitude. Man is that being who exists between 
two forms of non-being; the 'not yet' of the future and the 
'no more' or the past. To be finite is to be cognizant of 
the limits which encompass one's being. The question or God, 
which we shall discuss in more detail later, is the question 
concerning the courage to affirm one's being in the midst 
of such circumstances. 
This finitude which is characteristic of all beings 
in the world is experienced on the human level. This char-
acteristic of the world is manifest in the feeling or anxiety 
which Tillich calls 11finitude in awareness."l Tillich's 
thinking at this point is very close to Heidegger and the 
latter's description of emotions or moods as indications of 
the modes of being. Anxiety, for Tillich, is an ontological 
quality as dread (Angst) is for Heidegger. 
However, man would not be aware of these threats to 
his being unless he had the ability to transcend himself. 
To be aware of finitude one must be able to view it from a 
possible infinity. Infinity is here used in the sense of 
a directing concept rather than as something possessing a 
positive content. It is a demand, not a thing m.d "directs 
the minQ. to experience its own unlimited potentialities."2 
lTillich, Systematic Theology, I, p. 191. 
2~., P• 190. 
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What this means is that self-transcendence is a way of 
speaking about the fact that: 
the one reality (the self) which we encounter is 
experienced in different dimensions which point 
to one another . The finitude of the finite points 
tothe infinity of the infinite. It goes beyond 
itself in order to return to itself in a new 
dimension. l 
It should be noted that the phenomenological influence is 
present here also . The infinite (in- finite) is described 
in relation to the finite and its structures as manifest 
in human awareness . 
The positive significance of man's capacity for seem-
ingly unlimited self-transcendence is that, for Tillich, it 
indicates man's belonging to something which is beyond non-
being, namely , to being-itself . Just why this is the case 
is not made clear at this point in Tillich's discussion 
though some indications of the answer are found in his dis -
cus sion of the depth of reason as an awareness of truth-
itself as an unconditional demand (as the good- itself would 
be in ethics) . The situation seems to be that man is aware 
of an unconditional element in his life. This is a fact of 
experience . ~~thermore, this situation would not be possible 
unless man could transcend himself , as something unconditional 
is not found when one remains within the realm of subjects 
and objects in the finite order . Thus, the infinite, though 
a directing concept devoid of positive content , becomes the 
lsystematic Theology !f, p . 8. 
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medium t hrough which an awareness of the unconditional is 
possible. 
There is another way in which the concept of a positive 
unconditional element has a bearing on man's existential 
situation as a finite being in a finite world . We mentioned 
earlier that man is anxious because he is aware of his fini -
tude and the threats to his being . The categories in which 
he thinks the world make this evident to him. For example, 
the category "time" as experienced in immediate self- awareness 
"unites the anxiety of transi toriness with the courage of a 
self- affirming present . "1 Another example, the anxiety about 
having to die reveals the ontological nature of time and is 
the experience of non- being from the 'inside•. However , 
anxiety itself is possible only because of courage . Other-
wise man would resign from having a present and surrender ~ 
the annihilating character of time. The courage to be is 
necessary because the present moment must be defended against 
an infinite past and an infinite future . 2 
However, this courage is not possible on the basis of 
anything within the finite order . To be finite is to be 
contingent, threatened by negative forces, and having a 
definite end of being . Therefore , the question of how one ' s 
being can be asserted in the midst of the threatening elements 
raises a question which nothing in the finite world can answer . 
lsystematic Theology ~, p . 193 . 
2~., p . 194. 
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Nonetheless, affirmation is possible. Why? Because man 
experiences an unconditional element which gives him the 
courage to be. This courage, in the terms of religious 
symbolism, is "God11 and is that reality encountered in 
genuine religious experience. The question of God, then, 
is the question of a courage which can accept the threat of 
non-being.l Or, to put it another way, "God" is the answer 
to the question implied in man's finitude; he is the name 
for that which concerns man ultimately.2 
At this point Tillich continues his phenomenological 
analysis of the self and its structures with an analysis of 
what is meant by the word ttGod 11 • Here the issue becomes 
quite complicated as he speaks at points of finite being as 
"grasped by and turned to the infinite'', and then goes on 
to speak of the infinite as the self in its self-transcending 
quality.3 
Let us explore this last concept. What does it mean 
to say that the self transcends itself? Keeping in mind the 
fact that the self-world polarity is the basic articulation 
of being means that the self is so constituted that it must 
have an intentienal object. It is only in going out from 
itself and deriving the contents of its consciousness from 
the world that it becomes a self. Self and world are polar 
1~., P• 198. 
2Ibid., P• 211. 
3Tillich, Dynamics 2f Faith, pp. 16-17. 
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concepts, not entities possessing external relations to one 
another. The world of the self consists of whatever is 
present actually or conceptually to the self's awareness. 
However, the self's intentionality extends beyond the 
particular objects which are before it. The self can tran-
scend a particular perspective and imagine alternative possi-
bilities. This flexibility of the self and its ability to 
negate, as it were, the present perspective and to hold 
conceptually an alternative perspective means that it is 
possible for the self to think of a state of affairs which 
is no particular state of affairs. At this point, this is 
a negative conclusion. What is beyond all predicates is 
experienced as nothingness. 
At this point the intentionality of the self and its 
being turned toward objects seems to have overstepped its 
bounds. The self has so transcended itself that it seems 
to have come to the point where it is no longer in contact 
with objects which furnish the content of its own self. The 
result is the experience of despair and the loss of meaning. 
Intentionality itself seems to be lost as the self, being 
beyond all particular predicates, has lost the sense of being 
related to meaningful contents of knowledge or will. It finds 
itself confronting an unknown which cannot, by its very nature, 
be known because it is non-being.l This is the abyss of 
meaninglessness. Where there are no definite objects, there 
is no self. 
lTillich, The Courage to Be, P• 37. 
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Nevertheless, even when experiencing meaninglessness 
11 I exist". How can one account for the fact that despite 
the elements that threaten one's existence, I still have 
the courage to affirm my being and in so doing accept and 
overcome the radical doubt? The answer is that the self, 
when it transcends itself, not only experiences the fact of 
non-being (that which is beyond all particular predicates) 
as a threat, but also becomes aware of the power of being, 
that which makes it possible for existence to 'stand out of' 
non-being and to affirm itself. As Tillich puts it: ''Self-
affirmation in spite of the anxiety of guilt and condemnation 
presupposes participation in something which transcends the 
self • 11 1 What this reality is which one participates in can 
be unco¥ered through the process of phenomenological analysis. 
This courage is what is meant by the religious symbol 
"God". Again, to quote Tillich: 
Not arguments but the courage to be reveals the true 
nature of being-itself. By affirming our being we 
participate in the self-affirmation of being-itself 
(overcoming non-being). There are no valid arguments 
for the 'existence' of God but there are acts of 
courage in which w~ affirm the power of being, whether 
we know it or not. 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
The courage to take meaninglessness into itself 
presupposes a relation to the ground of being which 
we have called 'absolute faith'. It is without a 
special content, yet it is not without content. The 
content of absolute faith is the •God above God'• 
1~., p. 165. 
2Ibid., P• 181. 
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Absolute faith and its consequences, the courage that 
takes the radical doubt, the doubt about Godi into 
itself, transcends the theistic idea of God. 
We have moved from the experience of negation when the 
self transcended itself and could conceive of the idea of 
something being beyond all predicates (hence no thing) to 
an affirmation of the power of being . God is then spoken 
of as the power of being, rather than a being who might or 
might not exist . The point is this: if God is not a being 
he must be nothing, (no thing) . This is the abyss or the 
ontological shock. However , how then, if at the limits of 
our intentionality we experience nothingness (that which 
has no predicates and thus cannot be a coneeptual object in 
the usual sense of the word ) , how is it possible that we 
still exist (stand out of non-being)? This is the paradox 
and beyond all expectations . How can we account for the 
experience of the courage to be? Somehow one must account 
for the source of this courage. The abyss must also be a 
ground . 
So mysterious is the fact of being in the midst of 
non- being that theologians have referred to it by the term 
"revelationtt . This Tillich defines as "manifestation of 
something hidden which cannot be ~preached through ordinary 
ways of gaining knowledge . 112 Through revelation one en-
counters a mystery which contradicts the attitude of ordinary 
cognition. This awareness only occurs when reason is driven 
lrbid. , p. 182. 
2systematic Theology 11 p . 108 . 
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beyond itself (when it transcends the subject-object struc-
ture) to the abyss of nothingness which, in revelation appears 
as the ground of being. It is the manifestation of what 
concerns us ultimately and therefore has an unconditional 
claim upon us .l With this awareness of the unconditional 
claim we are back to our starting point : the religious ex-
perience in which ultimacy was manifest. 
Why , then, the need for the prolonged discussion of 
ontological structures and phenomenological analyses? Why 
is it so difficult to arrive at self-evident knowledge? To 
answer this question, we need to look again at some things 
Heidegger says in the opening pages of Being ~ Time. Here 
he mak~s such statements as the following: 
Every inquiry is a seeking (Suchen). Every seeking 
gets guided beforehand by what is sought . 2 
. . . . . . . . . . . . 
Inquiry, as a kind of seeking, must be guided 
beforehand by what is sought. So the meaning of 
Being must already be available to us in some way. 
As we have intimated, we always conduct our activities 
in an understanding of Being . Out of this under-
standing arise both the explicit question of the 
meaning of Being and the tendency that leads us 
towards its conception. We do not know what 'Being' 
means. But even if we ask, 1 hat iS""Beingn'l', we 
keep within an understanding of the 1 is', though we 
are unable to fix conceptionally what that 1 is' 
signifies. We do not even know the horizon in terms 
of which that meaning is to be grasped and fixed. 
~ ~ vagu~ average understanding of Being is 
still a fact. 
--
To translate the essence of what Heidegger is saying 
into Tillich1 s terms, though we have a preliminary awareness 
1ill..£.;, P• 110. 
2Heidegger, Being ~ Time , p. 24. 
3Heidegger, £2• £!!., P• 25. 
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of God (Being) in religious experience, the full significance 
of this for human life is not clear until we carefully invest-
igate the structures of being as manifest in the human person. 
Then, and only then, do we really understand what it means 
to be and the ultimate significance of the ground of being 
which gives us the courage to be. 
For Tillich, the reason that man's awareness of Being 
(God) is so sketchy and vague is the fact that man, by a 
misuse of his finite freedom is estranged from his own ground. 
In Heidegger, as we noted, the source of the problem was the 
tendency of Plato and Aristotle down through the~story of 
philosophy to dichotomize being and to speak of the self in 
terms taken from the natural world. In both Tillich and 
Heidegger, this turning towards Being and an awareness of 
it is accomplished as the result of a phenomenological method 
by which we can learn to see things as they are. For Tillich, 
the initiative is in some sense taken by Being. Man is 
grasped by the infinite and thereby turned toward it. This 
changes his whole way of looking at things. The natural 
standpoint is suspended but by an original awarnesss of an 
unconditional element rather than by a detailed methodology 
(Husserl) though subsequent analysis can clarify considerably. 
At any rate, reason, to be aware of Being or to enter into 
the religious dimension must undergo a change from its usual 
way of looking at things. Tillich puts it this way: 
Reason, according to the theological view, not 
only is finite and therefore unable to grasp the 
infinite but is also estranged from its essential 
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goodness. Reason stands, like everything in man, 
under the bondage of estrangement. There is no 
part of man that is excepted from the universal 
destiny of sin. For the cognitive function of man's 
spiritual life this means that reason is blinded 
and has become unable to recognize God. The eyes 
of reason must be opened by the revelatory presence 
of the divine Spirit in the human spirit. Only when 
this happens can truth be received by human reason.l 
Ontology presupposes a conversion, that is "the experience 
of being awakened out of the sleep of the natural world view, 
the sudden awareness of the light of the ontological question.n2 
One becomes aware in this process of that which consti-
tutes the object of his ultimate concern. ~his content is 
"a meaning which gives meaning to all meanings.u3 Unless 
there is a ground of being that can be experienced by con-
tingent beings, there is no ontological basis for the finite 
structures which give meaning and intelligibility to both 
the self and the world. 
It is obvious that this awareness of the power of being 
which is the object of one's ultimate concern can never be 
experienced except in the situation of ultimate concern. An 
answer cannot be given to a question that has never been 
asked. Hence, the · need for the method of correlation. With-
out the question of finitude (and the problem of nothingness) 
there would be, for Tillich, no need of the answer of reve-
lation. As long as one is on the natural level, thinking 
1Tillich, Biblical Religion and the Search for Ultimate 
Reali!l, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press;-1955), p. 64. 
2~., p. 65. 
3Tillich, ~ Courage !£ ~~ P• 47. 
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only of subjects and objects in a means-end relation (tech-
nical reason) the question of God is meaningless. It is 
only when driven to the question of contingency and the 
amazing fact that one can still affirm his being, that the 
question of God becomes significant. To hear the answer 
of faith, in other words, one must stand at the point where 
the question is asked. 
Therefore, though man has the experience of God, he 
is not aware of the full nature of it until he sees it in 
light of the structures of finite being and the questions 
these structures raise but cannot answer. Man's knowledge 
of these structures comes through a phenomenological analysis 
of human existence similar to the one undertaken by Heidegger. 
In this context what we discover is that the reality present 
to us when the name of "God" was spoken in the genuine sense 
of the word, we experienced the courage to be. This is what 
11God 11 means: the power of being overcoming nonbeing, an ex-
perience of which we are aware and which can be phenomeno-
logically investigated. To formulate the question in terms 
of existence of non-existence is to miss the point. Whether 
or not a being called "God" exists independently of us or 
not is a question to which we can never discover the answer. 
We never get outside our own experience and what is related 
to us. On this level what we experience is the almost in-
comprehensible fact of being overcoming non-being. It is 
this fact which is immediately present to us when we suspend 
our uncritical prejudices concerning the nature and origin 
of the religious phenomena. This is possible only through a 
phenomenological analysis. 
ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this thesis, as the title indicates, 
is to examine Tillich 1 s concept of religious experience in 
the light of the phenomenological method . Tillich follows 
St . Augustine in his approach to the problem of the knowledge 
of God, believing that one finds clues to the basic nature 
of religious experience in man himself rather than in nature 
or by rational deduction. For Tillich the key question is 
not, "Does God exist?" but what does the experience of God 
mean 12 terms of finite human experience . 
To carry out his analysis of the ontological nature 
of human existence as finite and as raising the question of 
God (that which can account for the fact that despite all 
the threats to the contingent order, this order persists 
and therefore must be grounded on something non- contingent 
and unconditional) Tillich finds the phenomenological method 
a valuable tool . He does not accept this method uncritically 
though he is greatly indebted to Husserl and Heidegger. 
Tillich feels that if phenomenology is to be an adequate 
tool for theology, it must be "corrected" by reference to 
final revelation (the New Being in Christ) as the criterion 
of the type of experience that needs to be subjected to a 
phenomenological analysis. What Tillich finds missing in 
Husserl ' s approach is any recognition of the importance of 
the experience selected as normative. Not only must pheno-
menology describe meanings, it must also indicate where and 
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to whom the experience has occurred. Nonetheless, before 
we can understand the particular approach Tillich takes, 
we must have a general knowledge of what the phenomenological 
movement is, especially as found in the writings of the two 
phenomenologists who directly influenced Tillich: Edmund 
Husserl and Martin Heidegger. 
Accordingly, the main body of the thesis begins with 
a chapter entitled "The Phenomenological Movement". This 
chapter begins with a general discussion of the principles 
and techniques of the phenomenological method. Here it is 
pointed out that one of the major tenets of the phenomeno-
logical method is to avoid pre-suppositional prejudices which 
would distort one 1 s approach to the subject matter. The most 
common prejudice cited by the phenomenologists is that of the 
natural standpoint. This is discussed at some length by 
Husserl in Ideas as he wishes to point out that we do not 
primarily and basically experience the world as independent 
and 11 out there", somehow making impressions on a largely 
passive consciousness. Rather, our world is always permeated 
by certain valuations and perspective variations. This leads 
us to think that consciousness has a more active and forma-
tive role in the knowing process than common sense assumes. 
Therefore, to study objectively the world and thus make it 
possible for philosophy to be a "rigorous science" ( Husserl), 
we must turn our gaze away from the natural objects to the 
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structures of consciousness and concentrate on what it is 
that makes it possible for us to have the experiences that 
we do in the way that we do. In order to do this we must 
"bracket" (shut off) any references which assume the world 
as objectively given, and reduce what is presented to us 
until we are aware of their essences (what makes them what 
they are). 
One of the things we discover when we bracket the 
transcendent referents of consciousness (Husserl) is that 
we become aware that consciousness is intentional, i.e. it 
always has an object. In Heidegger, this concept is signifi• 
cant because it opens the possibility of discovering or 
becoming aware of Being, the goal of human existence and 
knowing. What intentionality reveals, for Heidegger, is 
the fundamental fact of the self's relatedness to the world. 
Man is Dasein, Being-in-the-world and an analysis of Being 
as manifest in this structure is our best means of access to 
the nature of Being. In Heidegger, then, phenomenology is 
changed from an abstract methodology {Husserl) to an exist-
ential hermeneutic. 
Tillich is indebted to both approaches. He is indebted 
to Husserl for his emphasis on the need to focus on what con-
cepts ~~ quite apart from their existential references, 
and he is indebted to Heidegger for his concept of phenomen-
ology as the means by which one can discover Being (God in 
religious terms) as manifest in the human self. 
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Therefore, the relation between Tillich and the pheno-
menologists is very close at key points. For example, Tillich's 
concern for the meaning of religious statements involves a 
bracketing of such questions as ''Does God exist?" which involve 
the "natural standpoint" assumption that there is ~ being 
"God 11 , 'out there' somewhere and to whom one may choose to 
be related or not, or about whose existence one may argue. 
Tillich points out that unless what is meant by the word 
"God" is somehow present to man even in the very asking of 
the question and unless the question deals with a matter of 
threatening or saving one's being, we are not really dealing 
with a religious question at all. 
Granted that the experience of God is a reality to man 
before he becomes aware of it and makes explicit the question 
of God, how should we proceed to discover this fact? How 
may the "hidden" God of our experience be brought to awareness? 
Here Tillich relies on Heidegger and the use of phenomenology 
as an existential hermeneutic. If God is present to man even 
in his pre-reflective experience, and if what is meant by 
11 God 11 is the Being or Reality which sustains the finite order 
and gives meaning to human life, then the kind of approach 
that must be taken is to analyze human experience in the 
attempt to see what is really given in that experience. ~hat 
Tillich finds explicitly as the result of his ontological 
investigation by means of the phenomenological method is the 
amazing fact that despite the contingency and threat of non-
being, experienced as anxiety, man still exists and can affirm 
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his being. How is this possible? Only because, says Tillich, 
man experiences an unconditional power which gives him the 
courage to be and this power of being is what is meant by 
and pointed to by the religious symbol "God". 
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